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A Study in the Choice of Form:
Statutes of Limitation and the Doctrine of Laches
Gail L. ~ e r i o t *

Pity the poor statute of limitations. Throughout its long
history, its invocation has often been regarded by the public
and sometimes even by courts as somehow hypertechnical or
downright unfair. A defendant who invokes its protection has
sometimes been perceived as pulling a fast one on the hapless
plaintiff. This does not mean that these courts believe that no
limitation whatsoever should be placed upon the time period
allowed for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit. Hardly anyone is
foolish enough to suggest such a thing.' Rather, these judicial
critics of the statute of limitations regard it as an overly rigid
and mechanical method for determining which cases, in good
conscience, ought to be time barred and which ought not.2
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; B.A.
1978, Northwestern University; J.D. 1981, University of Chicago Law School. I
wish to thank Larry Alexander, Kevin Cole, Emily Sherwin, and Christopher
W o ~ e l for
l their helpful comments on an earlier draft. I would also like to thank
the participants in the University of San Diego's Conference on Rules and the Rule
of Law, Frederick Schauer, Jules Coleman, Ruth Gavison, Kenneth Kress, Michael
Moore, Gerald Postema, and Margaret Jane Radin, for sparking my interest in the
subject. See generally 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB.PoLV 615 (1991).
1. Indeed, Chief Justice John Marshall once remarked that a cause of action
without any kind of time limitation would be "utterly repugnant to the genius of
our laws." Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805).
I t is not unusual to come across a court apologizing for what it perceives to
2.
be a bad result forced upon it by a formal reading of the statute. See, e.g., T.J.
Falgout Boats, Inc. v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 838, 842 (C.D. Cal. 1972)
(dismissing admiralty action subject to a twoyear statute of limitations, despite fact
that plaintiff had originally mistakenly believed its remedy to be within the
Federal Tort Claims A d instead of the Suits in Admiralty Act, but stating that
"tilt is unfortunate that the suit is so barred"), affd, 508 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975); Martin v. Grace Line, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 395,
396-97 (E.D. Cal. 1970) (holding that statute of limitations barred action against
United States, despite fact that plaintiff did not know that United States was the
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Contrast the statute of limitations with the doctrine of
laches, t h a t golden girl of equity jurisdiction. Little
dissatisfaction is expressed by courts applying it. Instead, they
wax poetic about its virtues. According to one, "[Llaches is not
a hidebound rule like a statute of limitations . . . but is a
creature of courts of equity, founded upon common sense and
natural ju~tice."~Such a description carries with it the
peculiar suggestion that, in contrast, the statute of limitations
is founded upon something other than common sense and
natural justice. Laches, such courts have commented, "cannot
be used t o . . . defeat justice'" and "cannot be used as an
instrument of oppre~sion."~
Again, the reader is left to wonder
whether the statute of limitations can be used to defeat justice
or to work oppression.
Of course, the popularity of the laches doctrine among
courts is hardly proof of its superiority over the statute of
limitations. Instead, it may simply suggest that our legal
literature, dominated as it is by a seemingly inexhaustible
supply of judicial opinions, has a bias in favor of doctrines that
vest power in the hands of the judiciary. Courts like them;
hence, the legal system likes them. Insofar as the two
approaches can be seen as alternative positions in a struggle
for power and influence between lawmakers (such as
legislatures and appellate courts) and law administrators (such
as trial courts), the laches approach represents a victory for the
administrators-but not necessarily for the community. Courts
would be the last to express reservations about laches because

appropriate party to sue, even though the result was "unfortunate"); Boutin v.
Cumbo, 278 F. Supp. 223, 226 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (applying the statute of limitations
to dismiss action despite fact that defendant had been out of jurisdiction though
decrying result as "unfortunate"); Skinner v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 598, 599
(S.D. Tex. 1962) (dismissing case of taxpayers who had erroneously paid excessive
taxes as time barred but noting that "[tlhe Court is most sympathetic with the
unfortunate position in which the Plaintiffs find themselves, and is deeply
disturbed over the fact that, but for the statute of limitations, it is undisputed
they would be entitled to the refund"); Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 631 P.2d
222, 236 (Kan. 1981) (holding that the effect of a four-year statute of repose for
medical malpractice was "unfortunate" but nevertheless mandatory upon the court).
Whether these courts perceived the statute of limitations to be generally
wrongheaded or whether they considered the result in the particular case to be an
unfortunate but unavoidable result of a generally good and wise law is unclear.
First Nat'l Bank v. Wise, 177 So. 636, 639 (Ma. 1937).
3.
Westworth Village v. Mitchell, 414 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
4.
Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Humphrys, 97 F.2d 849, 858 (6th Cir.), cert.
5.
denied, 305 U.S. 628 (1938).
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it vests them with nearly full discretion to dismiss a claim they
believe ought to be time barred. If laches is wrongheaded, it is
wrongheaded precisely because it vests too much power and
discretion in the hands of the courts.
Cries of foul are thus more likely to come from (1)
dissatisfied litigants who object to a particular court's judgment
pursuant to the laches doctrine and (2) potential litigants who
object to the difficulty they have in planning their future
behavior given the uncertainties of laches. These litigants have
fewer opportunities t o register their objections publicly; thus, it
is not surprising that we see so little criticism of the laches
approach in the legal literature. It would be serious error,
however, to interpret this silence as approval of courts'
sentimental and self-serving view of laches.
The laches doctrine tends to take its licks only indirectly,
in the form of occasional general warnings about the dangers of
vesting too much discretion in the hands of judges. One of the
most dramatic warnings was voiced by Lord Camden?
The discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants: It is always
unknown: It is different in different men: It is casual, and
depends upon constitution, temper and passion.-In the best
it is often times caprice: In the worst i t is every vice, folly,
and passion, to which human nature can be liable.7

The criticisms of both approaches seem eminently sensible,
at least to anyone not fully jaded by the view that it is
impossible to constrain the discretion of judges by imposing
rules upon them.8 Indeed, the statute of limitations does
sometimes produce results that seem hypertechnical in view of
its underlying policy concerns. Like all rules, it is both
Formal application of a
overinclusive and underinclu~ive.~

6.
More recently, Justice Scalia has become known as one of the leading
critics of such discretion in judges' hands. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law a s
a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (generally calling for an increase
in the influence of rules in American law); see also Gail L. Heriot, Way Beyond
Candor, 89 MICH.L. REV. 1945 (1991) (discussing problems created when too much
discretion is given to moral decision makers).
7.
Hindson & Kersey, quoted in 8 HOWELL'SSTATETRIALS57 n.t (1816).
8.
See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (arguing that
the language of rules can constrain judges' discretion).
9.
See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGALSTUD. 257, 268 (1974); Duncan K e ~ e d y ,Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1695-96 (1976);
William Powers, Jr., Structural Aspects of the Impact of Law on Moral Duty Within
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rigid statute of limitations occasionally results in the dismissal
of a suit that was not, in anyone's view, unreasonably delayed
and whose delayed filing caused no undue prejudice to the
defendant. Similarly, formal application occasionally allows a
lawsuit t o be maintained that has clearly been unreasonably
and harmfully delayed. On the other hand, however, a doctrine
like laches, which vests the court with the authority to
determine whether the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed
bringing a lawsuit t o the detriment of the defendant, also
produces less than optimal results because, among other
things, it relies so heavily upon the wisdom and good faith of
the trial judge. When judicial wisdom and good faith fail us, as
they sometimes do, highly discretionary doctrines like laches
fail us t0o.l0

A. The Lawmaker's Choice of Formulation
In promulgating any kind of law, one of the tasks a lawmaker must perform is to select the best formulation of that
law-the one that delegates t o the law administrator the level
of discretion and authority that is just right. This is a complex
task," as I hope to illustrate in this article, using the statute
of limitations and the doctrine of laches as my example.
The doctrine of laches and the statute of limitations are an
interesting and familiar example of a rule-standard pair.12
Utilitarianism and Social Contract Theory, 26 UCLA L. REV.1263, 1280431 (1979);
Schauer, supra note 8, at 534-35.
See Scalia, supra note 6.
10.
11. See, e g . , Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 9. It is also a thankless task, since
one could hardly expect the law administrator to be happy about those occasions
when the lawmaker, for whatever reason, prefers formulations that purport to limit
the law administrator's discretion and authority. The tension this scenario will
create between lawmakers and law administrators is likely to be significant.
12. These doctrinal pairs come in two kinds, those that apply in combination to
the same areas of human endeavor and those that have separate bailiwicks. Examples of the first category include the laws concerning acquisition of a driver's
license. In general, one must be at least sixteen years old to get a driver's license.
This rule is designed to weed out those who are likely to be bad drivers. Passing
one's sixteenth birthday, however, is not enough. In addition, one must take a
driving test administered by an employee of the division of motor vehicles. That
employee is charged with determining whether the applicant possesses the skills
and temperament necessary to function safely on the highways. Because of the
judgment involved, this law is more standardlike than the age test. Like the age
test, however, it is designed to weed out those who are likely to be bad drivers.
Such pairs of laws, applied in tandem, are common. Another example is the combination of a strict rulelike speed limit with a standardlike prohibition against
driving too fast for prevailing conditions. By combining a rule and a standard, the

-

A STUDY IN THE CHOICE OF FORM
They are two differing legal formulations designed to deal with
the same underlying legal concern-that at some point a
plaintiff's cause of action ought to perish for lack of timeliness.
They do so, however, in very different ways. The statute of
limitations represents a r ~ l e l i k e 'approach
~
and governs cases
at law;14 the laches doctrine is a standardlike15 approach and
applies to cases in equity? Much of this article is devoted t o
a discussion of how and why this rule-standard pair came
about. This article will address why legislatures might have
chosen a rulelike formulation for cases at law while equity
chancellors and courts chose to apply the standardlike laches
doctrine t o equity. It will conclude that there are several factors, any of which would provide justification for the development of these starkly different approaches to limitations
law." My hope is, of course, to shed light on the factors that

law has cast two nets with which to catch the evil i t is seeking to prevent. If one
fails, the other may still be successfbl.
The other kind of doctrinal pair is comprised of doctrines that have application
to separate areas of the law. Included in this category is the statute of limitations
and laches dichotomy, which is the subject of this article.
See infia text accompanying notes 41-44.
13.
Although I have been discussing the statute of limitations in the singular,
14.
there are, of course, many statutes of limitation both within single political jurisdictions and across political jurisdictions. Statutes of limitation tend to have rulelike formulations, but they do so in varying degrees. Some statutes of limitation
are cast in very rulelike terms. For example, a statute of limitations that does not
provide tolling for infancy, insanity, or imprisonment is quite rulelike. See, e.g.,
ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 14, 8 752 (West 1991). This type of statute provides a
fured time period in which to bring a lawsuit regardless of the hardship this might
place on the potential plaintiff or lack of detriment it might place on the potential
defendant. In contrast, a statute that does provide for tolling is less rulelike. See,
eg., 21 Jam. 1, ch. 16, 4 2 (1623) (Eng.) (providing tolling for "feme covert, non
compos mentis, imprison[ment, and for being] beyond the seas."). Questions of fact
and law regarding whether the plaintiff is an infant, insane, or imprisoned within
the meaning of the law make the law somewhat more difficult to administer
properly. On the other side of the coin, it vests the adjudicator with somewhat
more authority to tailor the result to the fads of the case. Statutes of limitation
that provide for tolling if for any reason the plaintiff did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, are still less rulelike. See, e.g.,
IDAHOCODE$ 5219(4) (1992) (limitation period for cause of action arising out of
foreign objects inadvertently left in plaintiffs body).
15.
See infia text accompanying note 45.
16.
Just as statutes of limitation can vary, so too can the doctrine of laches.
Although all formulations tend toward the standard end of the rule-standard spectrum, some jurisdictions vest more discretion in the hands of the adjudicator than
others. Compare Gruca v. United States Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 1252, 1259 & n.8
(3d Cir. 1974) with Tandy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 769 F.2d 362, 366 (6th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986).
17.
See infra part 1I.D.
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generally influence a lawmaker's choice of formulation along
the rule-standard continuum.

B. Convergence
Much of the remainder of this article is devoted to the
interesting phenomenon of convergence.18 Over time, the application of both the statute of limitations and the doctrine of
laches has changed. The statute of limitations has, in practice,
become more standardlike and, to a lesser extent, the doctrine
of laches more rulelike. The formulation selected by the
original lawmakers has thus-for better or worse-been slowly
altered by subsequent law administrators. This phenomenon is
important because it casts doubt on the lawmakers' ability to
determine the optimal formulation for a given law along the
rule-standard continuum and to see that it is administered in
that form-at least over long periods of time. Law administrators enter the picture and alter the formulation.
The courts responsible for applying statutes of limitation
justify their decision to make them more standardlike by arguing that times have changed and outdated laws need to be
modified. They reason that the enacting legislatures would
have wholeheartedly approved the adoption of a n expansive
discovery rule and considered such a rule a valid interpretation, under the circumstances.
Maybe these courts are right; the argument certainly has
its sympathetic side. Regardless of the proffered justifications,
this transformation has effected a fundamental change in the
theoretical underpinnings of limitations law. Unfortunately,
once that change is acknowledged, the assumption that the
original promulgators of the statutes of limitation would approve of the transformation begins to seem dubious. Indeed, as
I will discuss, there are a number of reasons the enacting legislatures might be ill-disposed towards the transformation that
has occurred.
This article includes a discussion of what might be causing
this curious convergence trend;'' whether convergence is a
positive or negative influence in the law;20and insofar as it is
perceived as negative, the difficulty legislators face trying to

18.
19.
20.

See infia part 111.
See infia pp. 953-60.
See infk pp. 960-63.
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control it." This article concludes that there are reasons t o
distrust judges who transform rulelike statutes of limitation
into standards. Sadly, despite their best intentions, judges
interpreting and applying statutes of limitation have an incentive systematically to undervalue the need for rules. As I will
explain below, judges tend t o favor more standardlike formulations on the ground that they yield "fairer" outcomes and thereby reject rulelike formulations that provide superior guidance
to potential litigants. Rather than attempt to reconcile these
two competing functions of law-the guidance of adjudication
and the guidance of conduct-in a manner that reflects community consensus, judges tend, for reasons of self-interest, systematically to favor adjudication. Even more sadly, this is a
tendency that legislatures acting as lawmakers may be unable
to control, given the demands of the separation of powers
doctrine.
11. THEFORMULATION
OF LIMITATIONS
LAW
ALONGTHE RULE-STANDARD
CONTINUUM

A. An Early History of the Statute of Limitations
and the Doctrine of Laches
Although English law has long evidenced a desire to keep
stale cases out of the courts, in practice this policy has been applied in an uneven and erratic manner in both real property
and personal actions. ,
Limitations on actions to recover real property were established early in Roman law.22 England's experience, however,
was spottier. A good example is the writ of novel disseisin.
From its name, one would think that no action could be maintained under a writ of novel disseisin unless the disseisin had
been recent or "novel." One would expect to find some
device-rulelike or standardlike-that effectively cut off a
would-be plaintiff attempting t o bring a tardy action.23 In

21.
See infia part W.
See RUDOLPH
SOHM,THE INSTITUTES:
A TEXTBOOK
OF THE HISTORYAND
22.
SYSTEM
OF ROMANPRNATELAW 318-22 (James C. Ledlie trans., 3d ed., Augustus
M. Kelley 1970) (1940).
Indeed, Pollock and Maitland tell us that in Normandy-where the writ of
23.
novel disseisin originated-such a law existed. Only disseisins occurring since the
last harvest were cognizable. 2 FREDERICK
POLLOCK
& FREDERIC
W. MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH
LAW, ch. iv, !j 2, at 51 (2d ed. 1909).
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England, however, this was not the case.24 Common law
courts put no time limitation upon litigants. They apparently
viewed such limitations as the responsibility or prerogative of
the king or the Parliament, which acted infrequently and on an
a d hoc basis. No rule or standard was formulated that could be
applied indefinitely into the future. Rather than set a specific
length of time between the date the cause of action arose and
the latest date the case could be brought, the king and Parliament based limitations on a fixed date in legal memory. No
actions arising prior to that fixed date would be entertained.25
For example, a t the time of Glanville, a writ of novel disseisin would be entertained only if the act of disseisin occurred
after the king's most recent trip to N~rmandy.'~Glanville
quotes from the writ of novel disseisin as it stood in his time:
"The King to the Sheriff, Health. N. complains to me, that R.
has, unjustly and without a Judgment, disseised him of his free
Tenement, in such a Vill, since my last voyage into Normandy . . . ?'Unfortunately, such a method of time barring causes of action is only effective if English monarchs continue to
make regular trips to Normandy. When that stopped, other arrangements had to be made."
Limitations on personal actions were even less developed.
At both early Roman and early common law, rights in contract
and in tort were, in theory, perpetual. Under the common law,
however, certain procedural requirements stood in the way of
the assertion of truly hoary claims. Tort actions, for example,
were extinguished upon the death of either the plaintiff or the
defendant .29
24.
25.

Id.
By their very nature such measures had to be revised from time to time.

Id.
26.
A TREATISEON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMSOF THE
RANJLFDE GLANVILLE,
REALMOF ENGLAND
167 (G.D.G. Hall ed., 1983).
27.
Id. (footnote omitted).
28.
By 1194, the year in which the available plea rolls began, the limiting date
was Richard I's first coronation in 1189. Later, the date was changed to Henry
III's coronation. In 1236 or 1237, the date changed by statute to the time of Henry
III's voyage t o Brittany in 1230. No later date was fixed until 1275, when a date
in 1242, said to be the date of Henry III's fwst voyage to Gascony, was fured.
Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 39 (Eng.). This date was the only
time limitation upon a novel disseisin case until the reign of Henry VIII, three
centuries later, when Parliament Grst saw the folly of the ad hoc approach to limitations. 2 POLLOCK
& LAND, supra note 23, a t 51. Most writs had a similar
history. See id. at 51, 8 1 (tracing the history of time limitation upon the writ of
right and the writ of mort d'ancestor).
29.
See Thomas E. Atkinson, Some Procedural Aspects of the Statute? of Limita-
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Not until the reign of Henry VIII did Parliament enact legislation that moved in the direction of creating a self-perpetuating limitations system for real property actions.30The preamble to that statute articulates the legislature's reasons for implementing such a mechanism t o time bar state actions:
Forasmuch as the time of Limitation appointed for suing
[various writs of action] . . . extend, and be of so far and long
time past, that i t is above the remembrance of any living
man, truly to try and know the perfect certainty of such
things . . . to the great danger of mens consciences . . . and i t
is also a great occasion of much trouble, vexacion and suits to
the King's loving subjects at the common laws of this realm;
so that no man, although he . . . [has] been in peaceable possession of a long season . . . is or can be in any surety, quietness or rest . . . be i t therefore enacted . . . .31

The policies behind the statute are thus clear. Parliament
wanted to guard against the dangers of trying a case for which
the relevant evidence had been lost or destroyed and t o protect
against the uncertainty that arises when potential defendants
are left in limbo, not knowing whether or not they will be
Nothing in the statute suggests the members of Parliament
intended to promote a plaintiff-focused limitations principle
that would not extinguish a cause of action until the plaintiff
had a reasonable opportunity to bring a lawsuit. ~ndeed,the
statute may suggest, if anything, an emphasis on the defendant-focused principle that no cause of action should be maintainable if the defendant, through no fault of his own, has lost
valuable evidence in his defense o r has otherwise innocently
changed position to his detriment.
The Statute of Henry VIII did not provide a system of limitation rules applicable to all common law actions. Curiously, it
applied t o some writs of action but not to overlapping writs
tions, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 165 (1927); Developments in the Law-Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1178 (1950).
3 2 H e n . 8 , ch. 2(1540)(Eng.).
30.
Id. 8 1.
31.
32.
The former category includes all direct and indirect costs to society of incorrect factual conclusions resulting from the staleness of evidence and all direct and
indirect costs to society of fabricated evidence, regardless of the outcome of the
cases. The latter category includes the costs to society resulting from potential
defendants failing to take an optimal position or changing from an optimal position
to a suboptimal position out of fear of future litigation.
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that gave different remedies for similar wrongs. For example,
the Statute of Henry VIII operated to bar the traditional real
action if not brought within the period it specified. It did not,
however, bar a claimant's right of entry.33
This rather sizable gap in the law was not closed until
eighty-three years later when Parliament passed the Statute of
~
the advent of reasonably effective
James I in 1 6 2 3 , ~marking
and systematic rules to govern time limitation. The Statute of
James I provided specific lengths of time for numerous real
property and personal actions. It explicitly tolled these limitation periods for infancy, insanity, imprisonment, coverture, and
absence from the realm, but was silent concerning ignorance.
This statute is the model for statutes of limitation adopted by
American legislatures.
Nowhere in either of these English statutes did the legislature acknowledge the existence of equity courts. Indeed, the
statutes are so explicit in referring to common law writs that it
seems doubtfbl that the members of Parliament believed the
statutes would cover matters brought before equity courts. Perhaps it was merely oversight that no provision was made for
limitations in equity. After all, during the reign of Henry VIII,
the typical, well-informed individual might not have considered
equity courts to be courts, just as many persons during our
time do not consider administrative agencies to be courts. Parliament may simply have forgotten them. On the other hand,
perhaps it was deliberate. In any event, equity courts did not
perceive themselves a t the time to be bound by these statute~.~~
Nevertheless, the legal norm underlying the statutes of
limitation-that there must be some time limitation on potential plaintiffs-was not entirely lost upon equity judges. Numerous cases from the era of the statutes of Henry VIII and
James I, in which the court dismissed the action for untimeliness, demonstrate the concern with which equity courts
handled the issue.36 Not one of these cases actually uses the

33.
Bevil's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 862, 876 (C.P. 1575).
34.
21 Jam. 1, ch. 16, 8 1 (1623) (Eng.).
35.
See Halsted v. Little, 21 Eng. Rep. 121 (H.C. Ch. 1632); Evans v. Leasure,
21 Eng. Rep. 127 (H.C. Ch. 1630-31).
36.
See Simonds v. Lomley, 21 Eng. Rep. 113 (H.C. Ch. 1623); Garford v. Humble, 21 Eng. Rep. 113 (H.C. Ch. 1618); Byden v. Loveden, 21 Eng. Rep. 121 (H.C.
Ch. 1613); Moyle v. Dom. Roberts, 21 Eng. Rep. 776 (Ch. 1629-30); Winchcomb v.
Hall, 21 Eng. Rep. 501 (Ch. 1629-30); Porter v. Pretty, 21 Eng. Rep. 66 (Ch. 1604);

A STUDY IN THE CHOICE OF FORM
term "laches." Yet it is clear that, in some form or another, the
courts deciding them had subscribed to the substance of that
doctrine. The Latin maxim "interest republicz ut sit finis
liti~m"~'
is repeated in many of the cases.
In the nineteenth century, equity courts decided the laches
question according to the special circumstances of each case.38
Power was vested in the equity judge to do what was best. This
is in sharp contrast to the rulelike way in which law courts administered the statutes of limitation. In the early nineteenth
century, most American courts applied statutes of limitation
quite formalistically, thus magnifying the existing rulelike
qualities of the statutes.39When asked t o provide an exception
for the plaintiff's ignorance of the cause of action, one court
stated:
[The statute of limitations] contains no such exception. To allow i t would make the statute virtually inoperative. Those in
possession of real property, instead of being secure, would be
constantly subject to actions commenced twenty, thirty, or
even double that number of years, by some one who shows
that he or she was ignorant of their [sic] claim or righte40

The two approaches t o limitations policy-standardlike
laches and rulelike statutes of limitation-were miles apart.

B. The Nature of Rules and Standards
and the Environments that Give Rise to Them
In order to understand why a statute of limitations is rulelike and the doctrine of laches is standardlike, one must first
examine the nature of rules and standards.
Rules are characterized by simplicity of administration. A
rule will turn on a very limited number of easily ascertainable
facts. If those facts are found to exist, the legal outcome

Clench v. Tomley, 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603); Blackwell v. Simpson, 21 Eng. Rep.
95 (Ch. 1582-83); Sedgwick v. Evan, 21 Eng. Rep. 97 (Ch. 1582-83).
37.
Black's Law Dictionary defines the phrase as follows: "It concerns the state
that there be an end of lawsuits. It is for the general welfare that a period be put
814 (6th ed. 1979).
to litigation." BLACK'SLAW DICTIONARY
38.
See, e.g., Syester v. Brewer, 27 Md. 288, 319 (1867); Glenn v. Smith, 17
Md. 260, 282 (1861).
39.
See, e.g., Goodridge v. Union Pac. Ry., 35 F. 35 (C.C.D. Colo. 1888); Crawford v. Gaulden, 33 Ga. 173 (1862); Washington County v. Mahaska County, 47
Iowa 57 (1877); Mast v. Easton, 22 N.W. 253 (Minn. 1885).
40.
Campbell v. Long, 20 Iowa 382, 387 (1866).
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prescribed by the law will be a ~ertainty.~'
The typical rule
will be formulated in this way: "If A is true, then X shall be the
result," where A is an easily ascertainable fact and X is a specific legal outcome.
The degree to which a given law will be considered rulelike
will thus depend upon the number of difficult-to-resolve facts
that the law puts directly in issue and the amount of discretion
afforded the administrator in deciding the legal outcome given
the facts." Consequently, the formulation "If A is true, then X
shall be the result" is an extremely rulelike law, especially if A
is an easily ascertainable fact. "If A and B are true, then X
shall be the result" is slightly less rulelike if B is a fact that is
not easily ascertainable, such as state of mind. Still less
rulelike would be this formulation: "If A and B are true, then X
shall be the result unless the administrator is convinced that X
would cause the end of civilization as we know it." Because the
discretionary leash given to the administrator under this latter
formulation is extremely short, however, it is still proper to
classify the formulation as very rulelike relative to other possible formulations.
A rule purports to be simple to administer because it purports to shield the administrator from having to consider the
full range of factual circumstances that might be relevant t o
the underlying legal norm.'3 Whether it is in fact simple t o
administer will depend upon the administrator's approach to
rules in general or to the rule at issue." For example, a statute of limitations that states, "A cause of action against a
decedent's estate will, without exception, be barred if the complaint embodying that cause of action is not fded within one
year from the date on which a death certificate is filed," is in
the tradition of a rule. This rule purports to direct the court not
to consider whether the plaintiff was notified of the decedent's
demise, whether the plaintiff knew or should have known of his
cause of action, whether the injury was significant, or whether
any evidence favorable to the defendant has been lost. These
questions presumably have already been weighed wholesale by
41.
For an excellent discussion of the language of rules and whether it can or
should restrain decision makers, see Schauer, supra note 8.
See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1687.
42.
See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 9, at 266-67; Powers, supra note 9, at
43.
1277-78; Schauer, supra note 8, at 520-23.
44.
See Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV.J.L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 645 (1991).
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the legislature and thus taken into consideration in formulating the rule. The rule attempts t o shroud all other issues
from the administrator's consideration so that the only factual
issues will be: (1)whether this is a cause of action against the
estate of a person for whom a death certificate has been filed,
(2) the date the death certificate was filed, (3) the date the
complaint was filed, and (4) whether more than a year has
passed from the time the death certificate was filed t o the time
the complaint was filed. In nearly every case, once these factual questions are answered, application will be simple for all but
the most incurably argumentative.
Standards, on the other hand, allow a broad range of facts
to be considered. Moreover, once every possible fact question
has been answered, the legal outcome of the case may still be
in doubt, subject to the administrator's discretion. Thus, a
typical formulation of a standard will be: "If, upon consideration of A, B, C, D, and any other relevant factor, the court
fmds that the application of outcome X is the most desirable
one, then X shall be the outcome." Nothing is shrouded from
consideration under such a formulation; everything can potentially affect the outcome.45
As I have suggested earlier in discussing the statute of
limitations in particular, rules often receive only grumbling
acceptance in court opinions.46On the other hand, courts seldom grumble about standard^.^' None of this is surprising
given that courts derive power from the discretion vested in
them by standards; it should be expected.
What is curious is the fact that standards tend t o receive
favorable play not only in judicial opinions48but also in the
conceptions of justice popularized by history and literature. The
explanation may be simple: Standards lend themselves to a
sense of dramatic immediacy that rules cannot generate. When
it comes to drama, therefore, people prefer their doers of justice
to be actual adjudicators of individual controversies rather than
aloof promulgators of general law and to be wise and all powerful rather than mechanical and hemmed-in.
See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 9, at 258; K e ~ e d y ,supra note 9, at
45.
1688; Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Lugal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J . LEGALSTUD.399 (1973); see also Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 382-83 (1985).
See cases cited supra note 2.
46.
47. . See cases cited supra notes 3-5.
See supra notes 3-4.
48.
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Nevertheless, popular stories concerning both approaches
lend insight into the nature of rules and standards and their
relative strengths and weaknesses as instruments of the law.
Moreover, they illustrate well the differing legal environments
that tend t o give rise to each.
Perhaps the most well known of these stories is that of
Solomon. He was among the great practitioners of the discretionary, standardlike approach to justice. Fearful that he would
not govern wisely, Solomon asked God to grant him "an understanding mind to govern" the people of I~rael.~'
God complied,
granting his request with these words, "Behold I give you a
wise and discerning mind, so that none like you has been
before you and none like you shall arise after you."50 From
that point, Solomon sat in judgment of the people of Israel and
became known among the surrounding nations as an extraordinarily wise ruler.51 His rule was a personal one. No administrative body intervened between Solomon and the litigants
before him. He did not promulgate rules prior to deciding an
individual case in order to facilitate adjudication. Rather, when
called upon to adjudicate a case, he reacted to the totality of
the circumstances before him and tailored his "rule" of decision
appropriately.
The Bible records only one case as an illustration of
Solomon's wisdom-the well-known maternity dispute between
two harlots.52In that story, Solomon does not apply any preconceived rule; his general standard was "do the right thing."
He reacts to the full range of the circumstances before him.
Shrewdly summing up the situation, he orders the child cut in
half.53 One of the women consents to this barbarous suggestion." When the other objects and protests that she would
rather lose custody of the child than see him killed,55Solomon
awards custody to her.56
The people of Israel "heard of the judgment which the king
had rendered; and they stood in awe of the king, because they

1 Kings 3:9 (Revised Standard); see 2 Chronicles 1:lO.
1 Kings 3:12 (Revised Standard); see 2 Chronicles 1:12.
1 Kings 3:28 (Revised Standard); see 2 Chronicles 1113, 9:l-4.
1 Kings 3:16-28 (Revised Standard).
Id. at 3:25.
Id. at 3:26.
Id.
Id. at 3:26-27.
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perceived that the wisdom of God was in him, t o render justi~e."~'
Solomon ruled for forty years,s8 during which Israel prospered under his just reign.59 Rehoboam, Solomon's son and
succes~or,6~
showed none of his father's leadership talent. To
the contrary, he is described in Ecclesiasticus as "the folly of
' one "that had little ~isdom.'~'The result
the n a t i ~ n ' ~and
of his conduct was r e b e l l i ~ n The
. ~ ~ kingdom divided, never to
reunite." His is one of the great tragedies of the Old Testament.
Historical and literary figures illustrating the contrary tradition-a rulelike approach to law and adjudication-tend not
t o assume such heroic proportions in the public consciousness,

57. Id. at 3:28. Did Solomon believe that no biological mother could ever consent to having her child cut in half and thus that he was awarding custody to the
biological mother? Or did he believe that regardless of the identity of the biological
mother, it was in the child's best interests to be placed with a woman who cared
more for his safety than for her right of custody? We will never know. We can be
sure, however, that Solomon could not have successfully used this trick twice. The
next child custody case could not be resolved by threatening to cut the child in
half since both contenders would have been forewarned and reacted accordingly.
Solomon's was not a legal system built on rule or precedent.
58. Id. at 11:42.
59. See id. chs. 6-10.
60.
Id. at 11:43.
Ecclesiasticus 47:27 (Douay).
61.
Id. at 47:28.
62.
1Kings 12:19 (Revised Standard).
63.
Although the people had grudgingly tolerated high taxes and mandatory
64.
labor under Solomon, they were not inclined to do so for Rehoboam. The Bible reports that a delegation of Israelites came to Rehoboam and asked that the "heavy
yoke" upon them be lightened. Id. at 12:3-4. The Bible reports that Rehoboam
reacted as follows:
Then King Rehoboam took counsel with the old men, who had stood before Solomon his father while he was yet alive, saying, "How do you
advise me to answer this people?" And they said to him, "If you will be a
servant to this people today and serve them, and speak good words to
them when you answer them, then they will be your servants for ever."
But he forsook the counsel which the old men gave him, and took counsel
with the young men who had grown up with him and stood before him.
And he said to them, 'What do you advise that we answer this people
who have said to me Zighten the yoke that your father put upon us'? "
And the young men who had grown up with him said to him, T h u s shall
you speak to this people who said to you, 'Your father made our yoke
heavy, but do you lighten it for us'; thus shall you say to them, 'My little
finger is thicker than my father's loins. And now, whereas my father laid
upon you a heavy yoke, I will add to your yoke. My father chastised you
with whips but I will chastise you with scorpions.' "
Id. at 12:6-14.
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but they are certainly not unknown. Solon, the great lawgiver
of sixth century B.C. Athens, is a n excellent example of that
tradition. Solon's story is quite different from Solomon's. Solomon was born a prince; Solon was forced into public life
because, a t a time of considerable strife in Athens, he was perhaps the only man in all of Athens who was acceptable to each
of its factions.65
Once in office, Solon set himself about the task of legal
reform. He established a n elaborate code governing such things
as citizenship, inheritances, and commerce.66 When these
reform measures were in place, Solon sought out the members
of the Athenian Council and requested them to swear that they
would allow these changes in the law to remain in place for a
period of ten years. Once he had secured those promises, Solon
left. Sailing away on a ship, Solon was not seen in Athens for
ten years??
The legacy of his legal reforms, however, continued. Firmly
i n place, they no longer required his presence. Athens prospered and indeed became one of the well-springs of western
culture.
The contrast between Solomon and Solon reveals something about the nature of rules and standards. Both were great
and wise men of the law. Portraits of both grace the courtroom
of the U.S. Supreme Court along with the likes of Moses,
Hammurabi, Charlemagne, and Louis IX. Solon's code of rules,
however, was the product of a legal community that was at war
with itself. Lawmakers (Athenian Council members and persons seeking to influence that body) had conflicting ideas concerning the public good. Such a setting can only produce rules.
Warring factions would never be able to agree upon standardlike formulations, whose underlying principles tend to be all
too transparent. Rules were a practical way out of this dilemma.
This lack of consensus must have extended not only to
Athenian lawmakers but also to Athenian law administrators.
Thus, even if the lawmakers had been able to agree upon principles, they might have had to resort to rules rather than standards to implement those principles because they could not rely

65.
Set! ~UTARCH,
THELNES OF THE NOBLEGRECIANS
AND ROMANS 97, 104-05
(John Dryden trans., Arthur Clough rev., Modern Library 1979) (1954).
66.
See id. at 108-12; MICHAEL
GAGARIN,
EARLYGREEKLAW51-80 (1986).
67.

PLuTARcH, supra note 65, at 112-13.
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upon the law administrators to exercise discretion uniformly, in
an appropriate manner. Rules were thus necessary? The use
of standards could only result in an avalanche of unpredictable
or wrongly-decided cases from the point of view of Athenian
lawmakers.
Solomon had no problem with heterogeneous values among
his lawmakers and law adjudicators. Scripture does not record
any lack of consensus among the lawmakers of ancient Israel.
Solomon was himself the lawmaker; he was king. There is no
evidence of warring factions attempting to influence him on
matters of family law principles. Similarly, Solomon personally
conducted adjudications and thus he relied upon his "law
administrator to adjudicate uniformly and a p p r ~ p r i a t e l y . ~ ~
Solon's rule drafting cannot compete with Solomon's adjudication of the single maternity dispute on a literary level.
Solomon's ability to react wisely to a discrete human predicament makes for fascinating story telling. That does not mean,
however, that Solon's methods cannot compete on a jurisprudential level. Solomon's method has many disadvantages. I t
requires a lawmaker who is single-minded concerning principles of the law. It also requires a steady supply of wise administrators. When Solomon passed from the scene, no one could
take his place. Rehoboam proved to be ill-suited to the task,
and the Davidic dynasty's empire was doomed. Solon's rulegoverned legal system, on the other hand, though less dramatic, depends only upon the existence of one wise lawmaker. Once
the rule is promulgated, its wise promulgator is not
immediately required to ensure the day-to-day functioning of

The fact that many of the areas of the law Solon touched, commerce for ex68.
ample, require predictability so that citizens can act in reliance could only serve to
reinforce this tendency towards rules.
69.
Indeed, it is impossible to conceive of Solomon's fame a s a man of justice
with his emphasis on standards in any other way. He would never have been considered a wise man had he simply told his ministers, "I command you to look a t
all the circumstances and arrive a t the best solution." Arriving a t standardlike
formulations of legal norms is often simple; applying them to actual controversies
requires a wisdom that too few of us possess. Under those circumstances, the fame
would rightly belong to the ministers, not to Solomon, a mere source of broad,
imprecise standards.
Solon's brand of justice had precisely the opposite characteristic. His fame was
the result of promulgating rules to guide adjudication, not from any actual adjudication. As Solon himself perceived, once a well-considered code of rules was
promulgated, the most difficult task was complete. The only difficult task
remaining is to avoid the temptation to modG the rules inappropriately.
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the legal system. Solon could, as he in fact did, take a n extended vacation.

C. Selecting a Formulation
Along a Rule-Standard Continuum
How does the lawmaker decide which formulation along
the rule-standard continuum to adopt? One can only guess a t
the motivations of the British Parliaments during the reigns of
Henry VIII and James I or of the multitude of Anglo-American
legislatures that followed them in adopting the relatively rulelike statutes of limitation. The same is true of the motivations
of the British chancellors and the British and American equity
courts that developed the more standardlike laches doctrine. It
seems likely, however, that the same reasons that made standards appropriate for Solomon and rules for Solon would apply
here.
Any' individual lawmaker will have to consider the following in selecting a point along the rule-standard continuum to
cast the law: (1) the ability of the formulation to guide law
administrators to achieve appropriate case outcomes, (2) the
ability of the formulation to guide actors towards appropriate
conduct, (3) the relative importance of guiding law administrators to achieve appropriate case outcomes and guiding actors to
~ (4) the practical ability of the formappropriate c o n d ~ c t , 'and
ulation to attract the consensus of fellow members of the lawmaking body.''

1. Guiding adjudication
A lawmaker's choice along the rule-standard continuum
can be judged, in part, according to its ability to function as a
guide for adjudication. An optimum guide for adjudication is, of
course, one that over time will yield appropriate outcomes in
70.
The distinction between law as a conduct guide and law as an adjudicative
guide has been discussed at length in Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
Professor Dan-Cohen has suggested that different laws can hKiU these separate
functions. For such a system to work, of course, the actors whose conduct is being
regulated must be a t least partially ignorant of the dual system-some degree of
"acoustic separation" must exist. Under my system of formulation selection, a lawmaker could consider the practicability and desirability of separate laws for guiding
adjudications and for guiding conduct when reconciling the competing goals of appropriate adjudications and appropriate conduct guidance.
71.
See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 9, a t 260.
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the cases that are likely to come before the law administrators
for adjudication. By appropriate outcome, I mean a n outcome
that would have been preferred by the lawmaker if the lawmaker had been adjudicating on a case-by-case basis without
reference to rules or their possible benefits, omniscient as to
facts, and possessed of the quality of discretion that it deems
most perfe~t.'~
Obviously, no formulation will yield one hundred percent
appropriate results. Given that f a d finding is imperfect and
costly and that discretion is not always exercised in a perfect
manner, the optimum formulation for adjudication is one that
will minimize the costs related to: (1) incorrect judgments
resulting from mistakes in the application of discretion; (2)
incorrect judgments resulting from errors in the fact-finding
process; (3) incorrect judgments resulting from incongruity
between the formulation of the law and its underlying social
and legal norms; and (4) administration.
a. Mistakes in the application of discretion. When a lawmaker chooses a formulation for a given social or legal norm
that accords the law administrator discretion in its application,
it is not always because the lawmaker is indifferent about how
the individual cases should be resolved. To the contrary, the
lawmaker may be very interested in the ultimate resolution of
each and every case that is decided under the law. The lawmaker may have a definite sense of the right way and the
wrong way to resolve each case. The only reason such a lawmaker may fail to make the proper resolution of each case clear
to the law administrator is that it is difficult to articulate a full
set of rules that applies to every set of circumstances. The
lawmaker understands that it is impossible to anticipate every
possible factual circumstance and therefore is forced to cede,
however reluctantly, certain discretion to the law administrator
and hope for the best.
Herein lies one of the major considerations for the lawmaker. The further the lawmaker moves in the direction of a standard, the greater the level of discretion accorded to the law
administrator. The greater the level of discretion accorded to

72. Lawmakers may wish that their own sense of the appropriate exercise of
discretion be reflected in the law administrator's decision or they may prefer that
some other entity's, such as the community's, sense of the appropriate exercise of
discretion be the yardstick against which the administrator's performance is measured.
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the law administrator, the greater the likelihood the law
administrator will make an error.73
It is not difficult to see how discretionary errors might happen in the application of the laches standard. If the law
requires the judge sitting in equity to determine whether a
plaintiffs delay in bringing a lawsuit was unreasonable under
all the circumstances, certainly there will be disagreements
over what constitutes unreasonable delay. Should a person
with a debilitating, chronic illness but a clear mind be excused
for the failure to bring a lawsuit? Reasonable minds will disagree. Should a person who has been misled by a well-meaning
but meddling third party into believing that he has no cause of
action be allowed to proceed when he finally brings a lawsuit
that would otherwise be considered unreasonably delayed? The
possibility of exactly such issues arising and being incorrectly
decided (from the point of view of the lawmaker) is exactly
what must be considered when determining whether to use
standards in the formulation of a particular law. At least with
honest error^,'^ the further one proceeds towards the standard

73. There are a number of varieties of error (from the point of view of the lawmaker) that can occur when a law administrator exercises discretion to decide an
issue governed by standards. Only some of them can be categorized as honest
disagreements between lawmaker and law administrator. These good-faith errors,
however, are the ones expected to increase the more standardlike a law formulation becomes. Others kinds of errors, however, are the result of cheating by the
administrator. Such an administrator purports to apply the discretionary standard
when in f a d the administrator is going outside the standard. The cheating phenomenon can arise in four situations. In the first, the administrator attempts to
reach the result preferred by the lawmaker if the lawmaker were personally adjudicating the matter and actually achieves that result. In the second, the administrator attempts to reach the result preferred by the lawmaker if the lawmaker
were personally adjudicating the matter but misperceives that result. In the third,
the administrator attempts to reach a result contrary to that yielded by an honest
application of discretion and actually reaches an unintended result. Finally, in the
fourth situation, the administrator attempts to reach a result contrary to that
yielded by an honest application of discretion but actually achieves an intended
result.
Only the results of the second and third scenarios are errors, at least when
one looks a t the short-term picture. When computing short-term costs, only these
short-term results count. Unlike honest errors, however, one can expect certain
cheating errors (the first and possibly the second scenarios) to increase in incidence
the more rulelike the formulation becomes. This is because the number of occasions
on which the administrator perceives that the all-things-considered result will differ
from the result indicated by the law will increase as the law becomes more rulelike.
74.
See supra note 73.
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end of the rule-standard continuum, the greater the likelihood
of error in the application of discretion.
b. Mistakes in fact f nding. The possibility of mistakes in
fact finding is another cost of standards. The further one proceeds towards standards on the rule-standard continuum, the
more facts are put into issue and the more difficult it becomes
to resolve the factual issues. Errors in factual resolution thus
become more likely. Sometimes this will cause entire cases to
be incorrectly decided. Under those circumstances, the subtlety
of analysis made possible by the use of standards backfires just
as effectively as if the judge had erred in the application of
discretion.
Rules are parsimonious in their consideration of facts. The
more rulelike a formulation of a given concern is, the fewer the
facts that will be relevant in applying that law and the easier
they will be to resolve. Consequently, fewer factual errors will
occur.
Statutes of limitation, at least when applied formalistically, tend to involve the adjudication of only a handful of easilyresolved facts. Although errors will occasionally occur (and
when they do they are very likely to gffect the outcome of the
case) they will be relatively rare. Laches, on the other hand,
requires a very broad investigation of facts-including such
difEcult-to-resolve facts as what the plaintiff knew and when
she knew it. Errors in fact finding that affect the outcome of
the case are bound to be numerous.
c. Inconsistency between the formulation of a law and its
underlying legal norm. This is the other side of the coin: the
cost of rules. As one reduces underlying legal norms t o simpler,
more rigid rulelike formulations, there is an increasing potential for incorrect judgments-judgments that would not reflect
the lawmaker's preferences had the lawmaker adjudicated the
case personally on an all-things-considered basis without
regard to rules or their benefits over time. The rigidity of rules
creates errors.
For example, a rulelike statute of limitations will always
be both underinclusive and overin~lusive.'~
It will never be a
perfect reflection of its underlying policies. Suppose, for
example, legislators take the position that every plaintiff
should have a reasonable period within which to bring a

75.

See sources cited supra note 9.
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lawsuit. The legislature promulgates that legal norm in the
form of a rigid three-year statute of limitations. Sometimes, a
potential plaintiff may purposely wait until the last opportunity to bring a lawsuit before the limitations period has expired
because he knows that evidence valuable to the potential defendant will disappear. A rigid rule for time barring actions would
work an injustice here. It would be underinclusive in that it
bars fewer actions than justice would require. On other occasions, a plaintiff may have a perfectly reasonable explanation
for being unable to bring a lawsuit within the time specified by
the statute, and the delay may have worked no harm upon the
defendant. To bar such an action would not promote the stated
underlying policies of the legislators who adopted it. The rule is
thus overinclusive, barring more actions than necessary.
The doctrine of laches does not present the same problem.
Its flexibility allows the judge sitting in equity the discretion
necessary to avoid such errors.
d. Administrative costs. Finally, the gathering and presentation of evidence is not an inexpensive enterprise, as every
litigant knows.76Neiter is it cheap to maintain a judicial system that must analyze and make a decision on that evidence.
Courthouses must be built, furnished, and maintained; judges
and staff paid; and jurors taken away from their routines.
These are costs that must be taken into account in determining
where along the rule-standard continuum to formulate a given
law. If a change in the law does not yield any, or only a few,
appropriate results while greatly increasing the costs of
adjudication, then such a change is no bargain and should be
rejected.
Ordinarily, the further one moves towards standards on
the rule-standard continuum, the greater the associated administrative cost. The doctrine of laches, which shrouds little or
nothing from the judge's consideration, is more likely to involve
significant administrative costs than the statute of limitations.
Legal issues presented by statutes of limitation are more likely
t o be disposed of summarily.
Any individual lawmaker must weigh these costs with the
various possibilities of error outlined above to arrive at the

76. I discuss administrative costs only in the context of the ability of a formulation to guide law administrators to achieve appropriate case outcomes in adjudications. Of course, administrative costs must also be taken into consideration in
evaluating the formulation's ability to guide actors towards appropriate conduct.
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formulation most appropriate to guide adjudication. With this,
however, the lawmaker's job has just begun. In addition, the
lawmaker must consider whether a given formulation can
function as a n appropriate guide for conduct.
2. Guiding conduct
In addition t o considering the formulation's ability to
achieve appropriate adjudicative results, a lawmaker must consider the effect that formulation will have on the future behavior of the regulated actors. After all, law is not simply a tool for
resolving disputes that exist autonomously from the law. Law
affects behavior; people change their activities in response to
it.77
One of the virtues of standards in this regard is that they
discourage brinkmanship. Because it is never clear exactly how
a particular case will be resolved, those attempting to avoid
trouble with the law will not "push it to the limit." People cann o t rely upon t h e t e c h n i c a l overinclusiveness or
underinclusiveness of a rule to protect them when they are
engaged in an all-things-considered undesirable activity.78 In
contrast, the equal and opposite virtue of rules is that they permit brinkmanship. Because rules are easier to predict, actors
are in a better position to plan their behavior with confidence.
The key, of course, is knowing when to encourage brinkmanship and when to discourage it. For certain situations, providing predictable rules will serve no beneficial purpose. The
kinds of activities that will be fostered, if any, will not be valuable. For other, perhaps most, situations providing a safe harbor for actors may encourage them both to avoid prohibited
activities and to engage in associated beneficial activities. Soci~ obviety benefits from the creation of such a safe h a r b ~ r . 'An
ous example is commercial activity. Rulelike formulations often
provide the kind of certainty that will ultimately encourage
beneficial commercial activity. Before an entrepreneur will sink
resources into a new enterprise, she will want to know whether
her contemplated activities are permitted by law. If the penalty
for violating the law is severe enough, any significant doubt

77.
See JOSEPHRAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGALSYSTEM147-56 (2d ed. 1980)
(making similar distinction between laws governing adjudication and laws governing conduct); Dan-Cohen, supra note 70.
78.
Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1695-96; Schlag, supra note 45, at 384-85.
79.
See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 9, at 262; Schlag, supra note 45, at 384.

.
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may lead the entrepreneur to cancel the new enterprise completely-hardly a beneficial result. For example, laws with
severe penalties for selling drugs that are "injurious to the public health" may discourage commerce in pharmaceuticals altogether. Merchants may refrain from selling pharmaceuticals
that most believe to be highly beneficial (such as antibiotics) if
a minority believes otherwise. Such a standard would function
as a distinctly poor guide for conduct. In contrast, a more rulelike formulation, such as a prohibition against the sale of heroin and cocaine, might work quite
On the other hand, standardlike formulations may be
appropriate in other areas of the law. For example, a law protecting domestic pets from cruelty could spell out in excruciating detail precisely what kind of activity is prohibited or it
could simply prohibit cruelty to domestic pets. At least from the
standpoint of affecting primary behavior, it seems unlikely that
the rulelike formulation would have any substantial benefit.
Ordinarily, responsible pet owners don't engage in any activity
that is even remotely close to the line, so the need for rulelike
certainty is minimal. Only miscreants would be interested in
having a bright-line rule to skate close to.
How does all this apply to limitations policy? The primary
argument for the use of rules is that it encourages potential
defendants t o feel secure enough to engage in worthwhile activities once the limitations period has passed. A bright-line rule
allows a person who has been tying up resources in anticipation of being sued to release those resources into productive
use. For example, in cases that involve disputes over the ownership of real estate, it is hardly surprising that the potential
defendant in possession would be reluctant to invest heavily in
improving the property if he or she feels it may soon be lost.
Even in cases that do not involve disputes over specific items of
property, it is not surprising that a potential defendant would
be inclined to refrain from the most productive use of assets in
favor of a less vulnerable position. Why should anyone invest a
lifetime of savings and effort into a new Italian restaurant if
there is a significant risk that it will be taken in execution of a
judgment? It is better to spend the money on a vacation to
Italy and eat Italian food prepared by someone else.

80.

See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 9, at 262; Schlag, supra note 45, at 384.
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The effect on plaintiffs may be less significant. From the
standpoint of the plaintiff, the benefit of having a rigid rule,
such as it is, lies primarily in allowing for amicable settlements
when otherwise the anxious potential plaintiff might be forced
to file a law suit for fear of being time barred. The harm lies
primarily in the risk that plaintiffs will wait until the last minute to file an action in hopes that the defendant's evidence will
disappear or that the defendant will be inconvenienced by the
uncertainty entailed by the extra wait. The possibility of such
behavior being a double-edged sword serves to lessen the likelihood of such abuse.
Consequently, bringing the ability of a limitations formulation to serve as a guide for conduct into the lawmaker's
calculus will mainly influence the lawmaker in the direction of
rules.

3. The relative importance of directing adjudication and guiding conduct
Once a lawmaker has decided which formulations will
achieve the most appropriate case outcomes and which will be
most effective in encouraging appropriate conduct, the lawmaker must decide how to reconcile the goals.
The balance the lawmaker strikes will no doubt vary
according to the subject matter of the laws. The key is simply
that the person who strikes the balance must attempt to do so
from an unbiased vantage point. The lawmaker must not favor
one goal over the other for reasons of self interest. Instead, the
lawmaker's views should reflect a mature judgment about the
degree to which a given formulation will yield appropriate adjudicative results, the degree to which that formulation will guide
appropriate conduct, and the relative importance of each."
4. Attracting consensus

To the extent that the lawmaker is not one unfettered individual with a single mind about the policies he or she is
attempting to pursue, the choice along the rule-standard continuum will also be influenced by the need to obtain the level of
consensus necessary to promulgate a law.s2

81. See infra part II.D.l-2.
82.
See JAMESBUCHANAN& GORDONTULLOCK,THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT:
OF CONSTITIJTIONAL
DEMOCRACY
(1962); RICHARD
A. POSNER,
LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS
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The more standardlike a law becomes, the more transparent it is with regard to the underlying legal principle or principles that it is designed to implement. If the members of a legislature or other body authorized to promulgate laws cannot
agree on the underlying principles that should animate the law
they promulgate, they should not look to standards. Standards
cannot build consensus. Rules, on the other hand, by virtue of
the fact that they can often be accounted for by any number of
underlying legal principles, will often receive the support of
otherwise warring factions within the lawmaking body. Consequently, they may be the only choices available.
Limitations law makes for an excellent example. An individual can take several approaches to the subject: one favoring
plaintiffs, one favoring defendants, or a balance of the two. One
can take the position that no lawsuit should be barred until the
plaintiff has had a reasonable opportunity to bring it. Only
then should courts begin to contemplate whether to bar an
action as untimely (and perhaps only then if the defendant has
actually been harmed). One can focus on the defendant's predicament by maintaining that no lawsuit should be allowed
after the defendant, through no fault of her own, has suffered a
loss of evidence or other loss to a particular defense regardless
of whether the plaintiff has had a reasonable opportunity to
bring the case. In the alternative, one can attempt to balance
the competing interests of plaintiffs and defendants through
the use of some formula. These are policy choices that logically
precede the lawmaker's choice of the point along the rule-standard continuum.
The doctrine of laches cannot hide its sympathy with the
plaintiff-focused position described above. In order for a defendant t o prevail on a laches defense, he must show both that the
plaintiff delayed unreasonably in bringing the lawsuit and that
he has been harmed by this delay. Hence, only cases in which
the plaintiff has had a reasonable opportunity to bring the
action can be time barred. A supporter of the defendant-focused
position would have a difficult time casting a vote in favor of
the laches doctrine. Such a supporter could, on the other hand,
cast a vote in favor of a statute of limitations. A statute of
limitations does not identify its supporters so readily as proponents of the plaintiff-focused, the defendant-focused, or the
THE PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE
276-77 (1990); see also Symposium, 74 VA. L.
REV. 167-518 (1988) (discussing the theory of public choice).
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mixed position. All such persons might be willing to support it
as a "compromise" position. Most of the time it will produce
results consistent with all three approaches. Occasionally,
though, i t will produce results inconsistent with one, two, or
even all three approaches. It will not, however, systematically
favor one approach to the exclusion of the others. In that sense,
it is a compromise.

D. The Divergent Paths of the Statute of Limitations
and Laches
Assuming that actual lawmakers have considered the foregoing, one is led t o question what accounts for the divergence
in limitations policy between law and equity. Several possible
explanations come to mind.

1. The relative ability of the two approaches to guide adjudication
It would make sense for individual legislators to favor a
relatively rulelike limitations device to adjudicate cases a t law.
At the same time, however, it would make sense for those same
individuals, if given a seat upon an appellate court, to favor a
more standardlike limitations device in adjudicating equity
cases. There are a t least three interrelated reasons for this.
First, the case load has traditionally been regarded as more
homogeneous a t law than a t equity and hence better governed
by rules. Second, the adjudicators of cases at law (judges and
jurors) tend to be regarded as heterogeneous and not as
inclined as equity adjudicators (judges sitting in equity) to
reflect the same values a s the lawmakers who issue directives
to them. Third, the mechanisms available to a legislator to correct courts that have, in the legislator's view, incorrectly decided a case are very limited. Unlike the appellate court judge, the
legislator cannot simply reverse a bad decision. Hence, legislators may be more inclined to put adjudicators on a short leash
than they would if they were appellate court judges deciding
how much discretion to vest in trial judges deciding equity
cases.
a. The degree of homogeneity in case loads. The first possible explanation for the existence of the two very different
approaches to limitations lies in the degree of homogeneity in
the groups of cases to which they are applied. Relatively homogeneous cases can be governed efficiently by a rulelike
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formulation of a legal prin~iple.'~
The variations in the fact
patterns presented are such that a relatively rigid rule can be
fashioned that will produce unfortunate case outcomes only
rarely. The more heterogeneous the case load becomes, the
greater the need for standards.
Is it in fact true that traditional actions at law were relatively homogeneous and trachtional equity cases were relatively
heterogene~us?'~Certainly, the conventional answer to that
question would be yes. The history of the common law is rooted
in the notion that cases at law can be categorized in one of only
a handful of forms of action. Within each category, the facts
and circumstances surrounding the cases were thought to be
sufficiently similar to justify the application of the same procedure.
On the other hand, equity cases were, in theory at least,
the oddball cases. They were the square pegs that did not fit
the round holes available in the law courts. If traditional equity courts were not truly dealing with exceptional cases, there
would be little justification for having such courts. Given this
traditional view, it hardly seems surprising that a lawmaker
would choose t o apply a rulelike statute of limitations to
actions at law and a standardlike laches doctrine to actions in
equity. If actions at law are generally homogeneous and equity
cases generally heterogeneous, they are probably less so with
regard to the application of limitations law.
The degree of contrast between law and equity is probably
accentuated when viewed through the eyes of the relevant lawmakers. For example, legislators drafting statutes for common
law courts are often aloof from the day-to-day business of
83.
This is necessarily true because when I designate a given group of cases
relatively homogeneous, I mean nothing other than homogeneous with respect to
those characteristics that are relevant to a decision maker engaging in particularistic decision making. There are relatively few cases that do not fit the usual pattern. Consequently, there are relatively few cases that would be decided incorrectly
if a rigid rule were applied to them.
84.
I t is questionable whether the underlying facts of traditional law cases were
bland and homogeneous and the fads of equity cases exceptional. Perhaps law
cases only seemed unexceptional because the procedure traditionally used to adjudicate these cases, the jury trial, was so cumbersome that law courts tended towards
regimenting procedures that obscured the true range of facts that came before
them. This can be contrasted with equity procedures, where jury trials were unavailable. A good example is the stylized pleading rules used at common law. If
the underlying facts of the cases brought under those pleading rules appeared to
be bland and homogeneous, it is only because the pleading rules forced them into
such a mold.
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adjudication and thus may be unfamiliar with the courts' case
load. They may be tempted to oversimplify or to presume incorrectly that any set of cases with which they are unfamiliar
must be less complex and diverse than it really is. This aspect
of human nature intensifies the tendency towards rulelike
formulations for application to actions a t law. No similar lack
of familiarity exists for equity cases. Originally, the lawmaker
was the chancellor, who would have been intimately familiar
with equity cases. When appellate courts inherited the function
of lawmaker, the intimate familiarity with equity cases was
inherited as well. The likelihood of overestimating the homogeneity of the cases is small. Instead, the danger is the opposite:
losing sight of the forest on account of all the trees.
This parallels the contrast between Solomon and Solon.
Solomon was dealing with a single case. I t is not clear how
many custody battles he had to decide during his reign, but it
seems unlikely that the case recounted in the Bible was a
routine one. In any event, given the size of his empire, he
probably &d not take the time to decide ordinary cases. These
could be decided by ministers applying his rules. As king, he
probably concentrated his efforts on the extraordinary cases,
much the same way equity courts were thought to do. Solon's
codes, on the other hand, were intended to govern all the cases
that arose in Athens, the vast majority of which were likely to
be quite commonplace. Consequently, like the legislators passing statutes to govern actions a t law, Solon tended to formulate his laws as rules.
b. The law administrator's trustworthiness. A closely
related difference between law and equity is the identity of the
adjudicator. The importance of this factor should be clear.
Adjudicators who are perceived by the lawmaker to be relatively homogeneous, to share the lawmaker's basic values, and to
be capable fact finders need not be reined in by rules. On the
other hand, control must be exerted over untrustworthy adjudicators. We have already seen this a t work in the contrast
between Solomon and Solon. Solomon was his own adjudicator
and thus felt perfectly comfortable in ceding complete authority
to himself. Solon, whose adjudicators were presumably members of the warring factions that made up Athenian society a t
the time, had to rely on rules.
How does this help explain why a rulelike limitations law
developed for actions a t law and a standardlike one for equity
cases? A fundamental distinction between traditional courts of
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equity and courts of law was the jury. Equity courts, of course,
had no juries.85All decisions, whether on facts, law, or mixed
issues of fact and law, had to be made by the chancellor himself or, later, by professional judges. Courts of law, in contrast,
used juries as fact finders and as arbiters of certain
discretionary matters such as the existence of negligence?
How would the legislatures that enacted statutes of limitation have perceived adjudicators in law courts? How would the
equity chancellors and appellate courts who instituted and
refined the laches doctrine have perceived those who adjudicate
equity cases? The chancellor likely felt a great deal more comfortable vesting power and discretion in the equity adjudicators
than Parliament did vesting power and discretion in the law
adjudicators. Originally, the chancellor was his own
adjudicator. Like Solomon, he could be completely assured of
an adjudicator who would share his values. When equity
expanded t o include equity judges, the chancellor had every
reason t o believe these judges shared his outlook on life. If
nothing else, they tended t o share with him a legal education of
one sort or another and a background in the practice of law.
Legislatures enacting laws for common-law courts had no
similar assurance that their adjudicators would be kindred
spirits. Little evidence exists to show that the typical eighteenth-century juror had a lot in common with the typical eighteenth-century legislat~r.~'

Although litigants had no right to trial by jury in equity courts, such courts
85.
W.
have traditionally had the authority to convene advisory juries. See 5 JAMES
PRACTICE
1 39.10 (2d ed. 1992). See also FED. R.
MOOREEl' AL., MOORE'SFEDERAL
CIv. P. 39(c) (preserving this authority for federal courts acting in equity); Note,
Practice and Potential of the Advisory Jury, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1363 (1987).
86.
The distinction is crucial because it made equity courts possible. Without it,
the English dual system of justice could never have evolved. The extensive powers
of the equity courts, which go far beyond the mere award of legal damages, would
never have been permitted to develop had the power been lodged primarily in the
hands of nonprofessional juries.
87.
I n the eighteenth century, English jurors were adult males subject to a
statutory property qualification. In 1693, this was set a t ten pounds a year for
English juries and six pounds a year for juries in Wales. GEES DUNCOMB,TRIALS
PER PAIS: OR, THE LAW OF ENGLAND
CONCERNING
JURIES
BY NISI ~
J 91-92
S
(photo. reprint 1980) (1725). These requirements remained in effect a t least until
midcentury, with only a few regional variations. For the city of London, in 1730, a
hundred-pound qualification was imposed. 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25, § 19 (1730) (Eng.). In
Middlesex, where leaseholding was apparently common, men possessing leaseholds
worth ffiy pounds per year were qualified to serve on juries. 4 Geo. 2, ch. 7, 8 3
(1731) (Eng.).
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One thing is for certain: The jurors of the eighteenth
century were certainly not the elite of English society. Indeed,
an eighteenth century commentator described the petty jurors
at assizes as 'low and ignorant country people.""
88. MAKTINMADAN,THOUGHTS ON EXECUTIVE
JUSTICE,WITH RESPECT TO THE
CRIMINAL
LAWS,PARTIC~TLARLY
ON ITS CIRCUITS(2d ed. 1785).
Opinions varied tremendously, just as they do today, concerning the desirability
of the jury system. In 1956, Lord Devlin, speaking in the Eighth Hamlyn Lecture
Series, offered this defense of juries:
Each jury is a little parliament. The jury sense is the parliamentary
sense. I c a ~ o see
t the one dying and the other surviving. The first object
of any tyrant in Whitehall would be to make Parliament utterly subservient to his will; and next to overthrow or diminish trial by jury, for no
tyrant could afford to leave a subject's freedom in the hands of twelve of
his countrymen. So that trial by jury is more than an instrument of justice and more than one wheel of the constitution: it is the lamp that
shows that freedom lives.
164 (1956).
PATRICKDEVGN,TRIALBY JURY
In contrast, one year earlier, a t the Seventh Series of Hamlyn Lectures, Glanville Williams stated:
If one proceeds by the light of reason, there seems to be a formidable
weight of argument against the jury system. To begin with, the twelve
men and women are chosen haphazard. There is a slight property qualification-too slight to be used as an index of ability, if indeed the mere
possession of property can ever be so used; on the other hand, exemption
is given to some professional people who would seem to be among the
best qualified to serve--clergymen, ministers of religion, lawyers, doctors,
dentists, chemists, justices of the peace (as well as all ranks of the armed
forces). The subtraction of relatively intelligent classes means that it is an
understatement to describe a jury, with Herbert Spencer, as a group of
twelve people of average ignorance. There is no guarantee that members
of a particular jury may not be quite unusually ignorant, credulous, slowwitted, narrowminded, biased or temperamental. The danger of this happening is not one that can be removed by some minor procedural adjustment; it is inherent in the English notion of a jury as a body chosen
from the general population a t random.
GLANVILLE
WILLIAMS,THE PROOF OF GUILT271-72 (3d ed. 1963).
One need look no further than our own founding fathers for a similar divergence of opinion. In the heady days of the American Revolution up to the r a t s cation of the Constitution, one would expect antijury sentiment to be relatively
rare. Yet that is exactly the sentiment expressed by Alexander Hamilton in The
Federalist No. 83. In it, Hamilton expresses reservations about the wisdom of vesting juries (as opposed to judges) with the authority to decide questions of fact in
equity cases. According t o Hamilton, such a change in procedure "will tend gradually to change the nature of the courts . . . by introducing questions too complicatNO. 83, a t 570 (Alexander Hamiled for a decision in that mode." THE FEDERALIST
ton) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961).
Jefferson took the contrary position. Apparently convinced that the use of juries
yielded a superior method of adjudicating cases, Jefferson advocated their use as
f a d finders in all kinds of cases. I n a proposed Constitution for the Commonwealth
of Virginia authored by Jefferson, he urged that "[alll facts in causes, whether of
Chancery, Common, Ecclesiastic, or Marine law, shall be tried by jury." THOMAS
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The point here is simply that any lawmaker would have
been able to recognize the heterogeneity of juries, the risk that
they might not share the lawmaker's values, and the risk that
they might be incompetent fact finders. Consequently, any
legislature promulgating a statute of limitations had plenty of
reason to prefer a rulelike formulation if it was seeking to
maximize appropriate adjudications.
c. Ability to correct the law administrator's errors. The
lawmaker's ability to correct errors of the law administrator is
another important factor to consider when deciding between
the two approaches to limitations law. Unlike equity lawmakers, the legislature loses control once the law is enacted and a
case presents itself for adjudication. If the legislature is dissatisfied with the law court's resolution of the case, it can change
the statute but it can do little or nothing to change the outcome
of a case. The same was never true in equity. Certainly, no loss
of control occurred when the chancellor was both lawmaker and
adjudicator. Later, of course, equity became more institutionalized. Eventually appellate courts became the equity lawmakers
and lower courts the adjudicators. Even so, the lawmakers
remain in position to reassert control over an individual case
through the appeals process. When and if an appeal is made,
the appellate court may correct any errors the lower court has
committed in interpreting the standard. Thus, it can better
afford the luxury of vesting discretion in law administrators
through standards.
Hence all three reasons discussed-the homogeneity of
cases, the identity and perceived trustworthiness of jurors, and
the lack of mechanisms to correct erroneous decisions-tend to
move legislators enacting statutes that will govern law cases in
the direction of rules.
2. Ability to guide conduct
The lawmaker's desire to guide conduct can also account,
at least in part, for the divergence between the two approaches
t o limitations. Even if the guidance of conduct, rather than the
guidance of adjudication, is at issue, a legislator would have
reason to prefer a rulelike device for cases at law. If the same

JEFFERSON,A Bill for Re-Moddling the Form of Government and for Establishing
the Fundamental Principle Thereof in Future, in 1 THEPAPERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON

362 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
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legislator were given a seat on a n appellate court, however, he
or she would have reason to prefer a more standardlike device
to govern equity.
Some areas of law demand rulelike treatment or standardlike treatment not because such formulations produce better
adjudication, but because they produce better behavior. For
example, Solomon dealt with a question of family law-an area
particularly well-suited to standards. In theory a t least, family
law governs situations in which actors are not likely to conform
their conduct to the intricacies of a rule of law. Solon's rules, on
the other hand, applied to, among other things, commercial
law, an area in which more rulelike formulations are thought
to be necessary.
How does this explain the difference in limitations policy
between law and equity? As discussed earlier, laws have two
very distinct function^.^' First, they provide rules of conduct
to which members of the public conform their behavior. A good
law, from this standpoint, is one that best influences such persons to act appropriately. Second, laws provide rules for courts
to follow in deciding cases. A good law from this standpoint is
one that best enables the court applying it to dispose of cases
in a just and fair manner.
Although we ordinarily think that the same law must fulfill both functions, the principle of acoustic separation suggests
that this is neither necessary nor optimal.g0The two functions
will often conflict. For example, a very rigid statute of limitations may be the best law for inducing potential plaintiffs to
file their lawsuits promptly. Frightened into believing they will
lose their cause of action if they do not file immediately and
knowing that no amount of bellyaching over so-called special
circumstances will do them any good, many potential plaintiffs
will file promptly, believing they must. Moreover, such a rule
will almost certainly be best for persuading potential defendants to undertake socially beneficial activities that they would
not otherwise undertake without assurances that their potential liability has been extinguished. Nevertheless, a rigid rule
may be much less effective as a rule of decision than it is a s a
rule of conduct. A more lenient law allowing for special circum-

89.
90.

See Dan-Cohen,supra note 70.

See id.
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stances may yield an increased number of appropriate outcomess1in adjudication.
If a wall of silence could be erected between a rigid statute
of limitations as a rule of conduct and a more lenientlacheslike
rule of decision, one could enjoy the best of both worlds, or so
the argument runs.92 The problem is that the separation
between a rule of conduct and a rule of decision can never be
complete. Members of the public are sure to find out that, when
it comes to decisions, the rigid statute of limitations is in f a d
quite lenient. That, of course, will affect the degree to which
they can rely on the law and conform their behavior to it. So
long as the public's knowledge of the truth is imperfect, however, some benefit can be derived from a dual system.
The division between law and equity can in part be
explained by the concept of acoustic s e p a r a t i ~ n In
. ~ ~general,
the common law is considerably more familiar to both lay persons and their attorneys than is equity. It should not come as a
surprise, therefore, that laws applying to actions a t law tend to
be somewhat more rulelike than laws applying to cases in equity
This tendency includes limitations law. Members of the
public are more likely to be acquainted with the statute of
limitations than the doctrine of laches. Hence, the public is
more likely to use the statute of limitations as a guide for conduct than they are to use laches. Of course, the statute of limitations is not solely a rule of conduct; however, the public's
reliance on it as a guide for conduct will have some incremental
effect on its formulation.
The doctrine of laches, on the other hand, is primarily an
adjudication guide. Since members of the public are less likely
to be aware of it and thus to attempt to conform their behavior
to it, the doctrine can afford to be somewhat more standardlike
than the statute of limitations. A court adopting the laches doctrine need not be as fearful of the effect the doctrine will have
on the primary behavior of potential litigants as the legislature
adopting a statute of limitations for law cases. It can be secure

See supra text accompanying note 72.
See Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 M D . L.
REV. 253 (1991) (discussing the principle of acoustic separation in the context of
law and equity).
93.
See id.
91.
92.
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in the knowledge that, at least t o some degree, courts sitting in
equity operate outside the public consciousness.
3. Ability to develop consensus among lawmakers

So far I have been seeking explanations for why a rational
individual might choose t o apply a rulelike formulation of a
limitations principle to actions at law but a standardlike formulation to equity cases. Practical politics may be one explanation for the existence of this rule-standard pair governing limitations. The statute of limitations is first and foremost a statute, the product of a legislative body. The laches doctrine, on
the other hand, is the product of equity chancellors and courts.
Because legislatures are ordinarily made up of large numbers of individuals, they may be more prone than courts--certainly more prone than a single chancellor-to promulgate
rules. In order to forge a coalition necessary to enact a law,
conflicts among legislators regarding the appropriate underlying legal norm must be subordinated t o the task at hand:
enacting some sort of limitations law. Resorting to rules, which
by their nature do not put the legislature on record as advocating one approach or another, is the obvious strategy to take. In
equity, where consensus is easier to achieve, no similar tendency towards rules will exist.
None of this has any bearing on whether the statute ultimately enacted by a legislature will be a good law if judged by
its ability to function as an appropriate guide for adjudication
or for conduct. Nevertheless, it is important because without
the consensus of legislators no law can be promulgated. Additionally, without some level of confidence on the part of legislators that their compromises will be upheld by courts, no future
compromises can occur.
4. Systemtic diflerences in the perspectives of legislators and

judges
Finally, the possibility exists that two different lawmakers
might adopt strikingly different limitations formulations
because they have strikingly different views of what constitutes
appropriate limitations policy specifically or of the value of
rules and standards generally.
Self-interest may drive judges to favor standards. Unlike
legislators, judges resolve individual disputes for a living. The
importance of law as a guide for adjudication as contrasted
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with its importance as a guide for conduct is thus bound to
loom large for them.
Each judge knows that his or her decisions will be evaluated both for their quality as instruments of adjudication and for
their effectiveness in guiding conduct. The effect any particular
decision might have on an adjudication, however, is direct and
obvious: the decision is the adjudication. It will often be dispositive in resolving a lawsuit. The public will perceive the judge
as having correctly decided the case or they will perceive the
judge as having decided it incorrectly. Whatever costs or
benefits to reputation that accrue as a result of the
adjudication will accrue almost fully t o the judge or judges who
have decided the case. It is easy for the public to connect the
judge or judges to a particular case. On the other hand, the
connection between any particular decision and its effect on
future conduct is much more indirect and tenuous. Conduct will
ordinarily be guided not by one judge's opinion, but by a cluster
of opinions in the same area of the law. Consequently, no one
judge (or panel of judges) can be identified as the source of the
problem.
The best strategy for the ambitious judge is thus t o concentrate on developing adjudication guides, not conduct guides.
That way the judge can fully reap the benefits of being someone who correctly decides cases while free-riding on the efforts
of other judges t o create laws that are easily interpretable and
thus helpful to the public as guides for conduct.
In essence, what we have here is a prisoner's dilemma for
the judge. The problem is, of course, that if all judges pursue
this strategy, eventually the law will suffer. The systematic
overemphasis of law as an adjudicative device will result in bad
law.
111. THEMODERN
TRENDTOWARDS
CONVERGENCE
OF
LACHES

THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS
AND THE DOCTRINE
OF

Given the many explanations for the contrasting formulation of limitations law, it is both interesting and a bit troubling
that the two approaches are experiencing a noticeable degree of
convergence.
With regard to laches, this process has been going on for
quite some time. By the nineteenth century, American courts
had lined up behind attempts to limit the discretion of equity
judges in applying the laches doctrine. These courts held that
equity judges at the trial level should accept the length of time
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stated in the analogous statute of limitations as reasonable and
not deviate from it except in unusual circumstances.s4 The
laches doctrine thus became more rulelike than before-not a
surprising result given the increased institutionalization of
equity courts during that period. Indeed, one would expect that
as the equity courts became increasingly removed from the
single chancellor model and more complex and hierarchical as
an institution, they would turn to more rulelike formulations.
This trend has continued into the twentieth century.95 In
situations that require courts to apply the laches doctrine, they
simply apply the period specified in the most analogous statute
of limitationsg6unless unusual or extraordinary circumstances
In Tandy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc.,
dictate other~ise.~'
the court stated:
Several reasons underlie the use of the statutory period as
the laches period. It enhances the stability and clarity of the
law by applying neutral principles in an evenhanded fashion
rather than making the question purely discretionary. It also
requires courts to make clear distinctions between threshold
or special defenses or pleas in bar and the merits of the case.
It enhances the rationality and objectivity of the process by
preventing courts from short circuiting difficult issues on the
merits by confusing and conflating the merits of an action
with other defenseseg8
94.
See, e.g., Godden v. Kimmell, 99 U.S. 201 (1878); Wagner v. Baird, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 234 (1849); Kelley v. Boettcher, 85 F. 55, 62 (8th Cir. 1898).
95.
See Deudopmnts in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, supra note 29, a t
1184.
96.
See DeSilvio v. h d e n t i a l Lines, Inc., 701 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983); Goodman
v. McDomell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
913 (1980); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 592 F.2d 346, 348 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).
97.
The strength of the presumption in favor of the statutory period varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Consequently, the degree to which the laches doctrine is made more rulelike by that presumption varies. But i t is clear that in
each such jurisdiction the level of discretion wielded by a judge sitting in equity is
limited. See Tandy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 769 F.2d 362, 366 (6th Cir.
1985) C[I]f the analogous statute of limitation has not elapsed, there is a strong
presumption that plaintiffs delay in bringing the suit for monetary relief is reasonable . . . ."), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986); Gruca v. United States Steel Corp.,
495 F.2d 1252, 1259 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1974) (stating that the effect of analogous statute of limitations on the application of laches in an equity case is simply to determine on which party the burden to demonstrate. unreasonableness should lie);
Layton Pure Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co., 182 F. 35, 40 (8th Cir. 1910)
(finding that the analogous statute of limitations will be applied to trademark case
except under hnusual conditions or extraordinary circums&ncesn).
98.
769 F.2d a t 365.
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There is, of course, a price to pay for stability and clarity
in the law. In some cases, limitations on a judge's discretion
will force unwanted results. Now and then, one will find a case
that cannot in good faith be classified as extraordinary and yet,
all things considered, justice would be better served by an outcome contrary to that dictated by the analogous statute of limitations.
More interesting is the tendency of American courts to
move the statute of limitations in the direction of the standardlike laches doctrine. Traditionally, most statutes of limitations
have provided that a cause of action would be barred a certain
number of years after the cause of action accrued.99Such statutes did not explicitly allow for a tolling of the limitations
period based on plaintiffs ignorance of facts suggesting a claim.
When they explicitly allowed for tolling a t all, they did so for
infancy, imprisonment, or insanity, but not ignorance.'" Over
time, this has been changed by court decisions engrafting
everexpanding discovery rules into statutes of limitation. These
discovery rules toll the commencement of the limitations period
when plaintiff is excusably unaware of his or her cause of
action.
Through these seemingly minor modifications, the courts
have achieved a near convergence of the statute of limitations
and the doctrine of laches. Indeed, some courts have rendered
them barely distinguishable in practice. lo'
Prior to the advent of discovery rules, statutes of limitation
essentially operated like this: A specific length of time was
selected by the legislature to cover all cases that fell into a particular category of substantive law. For example, certain tort
cases might be barred after three yearslo2 and cases founded

99.
See, eg., 21 Jam. 1, ch. 16 (1623) (Eng.).
100. See id.
101. During the nineteenth century, plaintiffs ignorance of his or her cause of
action was ordinarily insufficient to toll the commencement of a limitations period,
unless the defendant fraudulently concealed information regarding the cause of action from plaintiff. See, e.g., Distrid Township of Crawford v. Gaulden, 33 Ga. 173
(1862); Boomer v. French, 40 Iowa 601 (1875); Mast v. Easton, 22 N.W. 253 W n n .
1885). The practice of equitably tolling the commencement of a limitations period
during any period the defendant had fraudulently concealed facts relating to plaintiffs cause of action was well-established even in the nineteenth century. See, e.g.,
Campbell v. Long, 20 Iowa 382 (1866); Garrett v. Conklin, 52 Mo. App. 654, 659
(1892).
102. See, e.g., MICH. COMP.LAWS 600.5805(8) (1991).
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upon debt arising out of a written contract might be barred
after six years.lo3 The length of time would be such that most
(but not all) plaintiffs whose cause of action fell within that
category of cases would have sufficient time to discover their
cause of action and file in court. Significantly, however, the
calculation of the appropriate length of time was done a t the
wholesale level. The issue was whether the number of years
provided by the statute was an adequate length of time for the
great number of cases, not whether it was adequate in any
particular case. Because a bright-line limitations rule allowed
potential defendants to feel secure enough to carry on ordinary,
productive lives, individualized consideration was thought
unwise.
Once a n expansive discovery rule was added onto the statute of limitations, everything changed. No longer was the calculation of the appropriate length of time done wholesale; it was
individualized. As a consequence, a court must now determine,
for each cause of action, whether a particular plaintiff has had
adequate notice of the need to take action.
This important change in limitations law deserves special
scrutiny. Equitable doctrines, like laches, were created by
courts and thus are for the courts to modify. Judicial modification of statutes is something different. When courts modify
statutes passed by legislatures, it raises a complex set of
issues.
The kinds of cases for which courts were originally most
likely to fashion a discovery rule were those in which the cause
of action could not be known by the plaintiff. The prototypical
example is the medical malpractice cases i n which the surgeon
leaves some undesirable material in the patient after surgery.lo4 This was often referred to as the foreign object
rule. lo5
Later, some jurisdictions expanded the foreign object rule
to include ordinary medical malpractice, legal malpractice, and

103. See, e.g., HAW. REV.STAT. 8 657-1 (1985).
104. See, e.g., Burke v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 293 F. Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1968),
rev'd on other grounds, 475 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1973); City of Miami v. Brooks, 70
So. 2d 306, 309 (Fla. 1954); Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 389 P.2d 224 (Idaho
1964); Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hosp., 417 P.2d 469, 473 (Mont. 1966); Fernandi v.
Strully, 173 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1961); Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 290 N.E.2d 916
(Ohio 1972); Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996 (Or. 1966); Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d
788 (Pa. 1959); Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 144 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1965).
105. See, e.g., Burns v. Bell, 409 A.2d 614 (D.C. 1979).
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products liability cases in which the plaintiff was neither aware
of his or her injury nor in the exercise of due diligence should
the plaintiff have been aware. This rule became known as the
discovery rule.lo6
This expansion quickly led to the obvious question: Just
what is it that has to be discovered in order to trigger the rule?
Suppose a tort victim is aware of the fact of his or her injury,
but not that it was caused by the defendant. Suppose the victim is not aware of facts indicating that the defendant's conduct was wrongfid (for example, negligent in the case of a
negligence cause of action). How much information is enough?
Should the limitations period's commencement be delayed until
plaintiff is in possession of sufficient facts to give notice of each
element of the cause of action?
A few courts have balked a t extending the discovery rule
quite so far. Prominent among these is United States v.
Kubri~k,'~'in which the Supreme Court decided the question
for cases brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act.lo8 In
Kubrick, plaintiff was given an antibiotic at a veterans' hospital
that caused him to become partially deaf. The court of appeals
ruled that
even though a plaintiff is aware of his injury and of the
defendant's responsibility for it, the statute of limitations does
not run where the plaintiff shows that "in the exercise of due
diligence he did not know, nor should he have known, facts
which would have alerted a reasonable person to the possibility that the treatment was improper."10g

The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that such a rule would
unduly and unfairly delay the commencement of the limitations
period. It therefore reversed, holding that a cause of action
accrues when the plaintiff knows of the injury and its
cause.110 The Court stated: "[A] plaintiff such as Kubrick,
106. Id.
107. 444 U.S. 111 (1979), rev'g 581 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1978).
108.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1988).
109. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 116 (citation omitted).
110.
Cases decided by federal courts applying state law generally support
Kubrick. In Timberlake v. A.H. Robins Co., 727 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1984), for
example, the plaintiff had contracted a pelvic infection and had been told by her
doctor that her problem was probably caused by her intrauterine contraceptive
device. She did nothing, however, until three years later, when she saw a television show that indicated her injury may have been the result of the manufacturer's
negligence. She then filed suit. The court held that despite her lack of knowledge
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armed with the facts about the harm done t o him, can protect
himself by seeking advice in the medical and legal community.
To excuse him from promptly doing so by postponing the accrual of his claim would undermine the purpose of the limitations
statute . . . ."ll'
Kubrick and its progeny112 stand for the proposition that
once a plaintiff is aware of the existence of his or her injury
and its cause, the limitations period begins t o run regardless of
whether plaintiff has or should have evidence of negligence or
other wrongdoing. These cases take the position that the limitations period prescribed in the statute is the time for a potential plaintiff who realizes that he or she has been injured by
the defendant to seek whatever evidence he or she needs and
make a decision whether to bring a lawsuit. The time period is
rigid and fixed and hence will occasionally work an injustice t o
a plaintiff. Sometimes it will be too short for the plaintiff t o
discover sufficient facts upon which to predicate a cognizable
claim. But it will provide desirable results more often than an
approach that vests the trier of fact with the authority to carry
out the hopeless task of determining whether the plaintiff was

of the defendant's negligence, her cause of action accrued at the time she learned
of her infection and its likely cause. At that point, she was on notice to investigate
the situation within the two-year period allotted by the Texas statute of limitations. Since she had not done so, the court rendered summary judgment for the
defendant.
Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H.Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1983), is nearly
identical to Timberlake. The court held that, under California law, the injured
party must bring suit within one year of discovering the physical cause of her
injury. The Court refused to toll the limitations period until the injured party
learned facts suggesting that the defendant's conduct was tortious. Accord Fidler v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 714 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that the Massachusetts
statute of limitations began to run on plaintiff, injured as a result of droplets of a
chemical substance being left in her body after an X-ray, as soon as she was told
her pain might be caused by these droplets and not later when she learned of
manufacturer's negligence); Davis v. United States, 642 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982) (refusing to extend limitations period on suit
against manufacturer of allegedly defective vaccine when injured party had known
all along he had been injured by the vaccine but had only recently learned of early
test results indicating the vaccine had been unsafe); Pauley v. Combustion Eng'g,
Inc., 528 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. W. Va. 1981) (holding that cause of action of asbestosis victim accrued when he learned of his injury and its actual cause, not when he
learned of its legal cause); Bosworth v. Plummer, 510 F. Supp. 1027 (W.D. Pa.
1981) (holding that the cause of action against dodor for medical malpractice accrued when parents were told that infant suffered cerebral palsy as a result of
lack of oxygen at birth, not later when they learned facts suggesting negligence).
111. Kubrick, 444 U.S. a t 123.
112. See cases cited supra note 110.
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actually aware of facts suggesting defendant's negligence and,
if not, whether plaintiff should have been aware of these facts.
Kubrick and the cases that follow it attempt to halt the
progress of the discovery rule. They draw an arbitrary line and
refuse to go further. The particular line they draw may be
difficult to defend. If it makes sense to deviate from the express
language of the statute t o toll the statute when plaintiff is
blamelessly ignorant of the identity of the individual, it is difficult to see why it should not also make sense t o toll the statute
when the plaintiff is blamelessly ignorant of facts suggesting
negligence. Nevertheless, the line preserves some of the
rulelike qualities of the statute of limitations.
Although at least one court has referred to Kubrick as the
recent cases suggest otherwise. A review of
majority r ~ l e , ' ' ~
cases from state courts suggests Kubriek is losing ground as a
new generation of expansive discovery rules is being adopted.
Bussineau u. President & Directors of Georgetown College''* is a good example. The plaintiff in that case brought
an action for dental malpractice. As a result of "an externally
caused traumatic injury to her face and
she
became a patient at Georgetown Dental School. During the
course of her treatment there, she complained on numerous
occasions about the results of the work being done. She experienced considerable pain and difficulty, including a problem
with tooth movement. She was assured, however, that the
treatment she had received was appropriately rendered and
that the results were simply unfortunate. Not until many years
later did plaintiff learn from another dentist that the work had
been shoddily done. Rejecting Kubrick, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals adopted a rule under which the limitations
period does not commence until the plaintiff has real or constructive knowledge of her injury, its cause in fact, and some
evidence of wrongdoing.l16 The plaintiffs case, as articulated
by her complaint, was thus allowed t o proceed.
North Coast Air Services, Ltd. u. Grumman Corp.,ll7 a
products liability case, is another example of an expansion

113.
Mack v. A.H. Robins Co., 573 F. Supp. 149, 154 (D. Ariz. 1983), affd per
curium, 759 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1985).
114.
518 A.2d 423 (D.C. 1986).
Id. at 425.
115.
Id. at 435.
116.
117.
759 P.2d 405 (Wash. 1988).
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beyond Kubrick. In North Coast, plaintiffs' decedent was a pilot
who was killed when his small plane crashed. Investigating
authorities originally attributed the crash t o pilot error. Many
years later, however, plaintiffs learned that the airplane might
have been defective. The tworyear limitations period had
expired if the discovery rule tolled the commencement of the
limitations period only until the plaintiffs had knowledge or
should have had knowledge of (1) the plaintiffs' decedent's
injury and (2) the causal connection between the airplane and
the injury. It had not expired, however, if the plaintiffs must
have, in addition, actual or constructive knowledge of the
wrongfulness of defendant's behavior (for example, in a strict
liability action, knowledge that the product was defective and
hence that the defendant placed a defective product into commerce). The court held that such additional knowledge was
necessary.11s

118. North Coast was decided nine years after Ohler v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 598
P.2d 1358, 1360 (Wash. 1979), in which the Washington Supreme Court declared in
no uncertain terms that a medical malpractice claim "did not accrue until [plaintiff] discovered or reasonably should have discovered all of the essential elements
of her possible cause of action, i.e. duty, breach, causation and damages." Plaintiff
had been born prematurely and placed in an incubator where she was administered excessive amounts of oxygen. This exposure resulted in her blindness. For
many years, she believed that the oxygen had been administered properly and that
her blindness was an unfortunate by-produd of necessary medical treatment that
had saved her life. When she learned fads suggesting that the hospital's treatment
had in fad been contrary to proper medical practice, she brought suit. The court
held that the limitations period had not expired. In the wake of that decision, the
Washington State Legislature enacted a statute providing that "no claim under this
chapter may be brought more than three years from the time the claimant discovered or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered the harm and its
cause." WASH.REV. CODEANN. 8 7.72.060(3) (West Supp. 1992).
The legislative history of the statute made it reasonably clear that it was
passed in response to the Ohler decision. The committee report stated that it intended "to modify the discovery rule announced in Ohler* and that the Ohler rule
unjustifiably extends the period during which an action may be brought. Wash. St.
Sen. J., 47th Leg., 626 (1981).
A colloquy on the floor of the State Senate proceeded as follows:
Senator Newhouse: "[Ils the statute of limitations provision in section
7(3) intended to overrule our Supreme Court's decision in Ohler vs. Tacoma General Hospital, in which it was held that the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered each and every
element of his or her cause of action?"
Senator Bottiger: "Yes, the discovery rule would apply only to the
discovery of the harm and its cause. In this context, 'discovery of the
cause' merely means the discovery that the product was casually [sic]
connected with the harm. It does not mean the discovery of the nature of
the defect of the product."
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Bussineau and North Coast are excellent examples of
expansive discovery rules. They call upon the trier of fact to
determine at what point the plaintiff knew or should have
known of (1) facts suggesting injury; (2) facts suggesting that
defendant caused the injury; and (3) facts suggesting
defendant's wrongfulness. When this rule is combined with the
already existing tolling rule for infancy, insanity and imprisonment, the issue becomes remarkably similar to that presented
in a laches case: reasonableness. Essentially, the trier of fact is
asked to determine whether the plaintiff has had a reasonable
opportunity to bring a lawsuit. The statute of limitations is
thus stripped of much of its rulelike character.
Is it a good thing or a bad thing for courts t o have such
control over law formulation? One optimistic way to look at it
is this: Legislatures formulate statutes along the rule-standard
continuum in the manner that they consider to be optimal. The
statute is then passed to the courts' custody for administration.
In most cases, the courts will apply the statute in a manner
consistent with the legislature's original formulation for two
reasons. First, judges share many values and perceptions about
the world with members of the legislature and hence do not
have fundamental disagreements with the legislature about the
formulation of a law. Second, judges accord the legislature a
certain amount of deference in any event. Thus, they have no
desire to deviate from the legislature's vision except in truly
unusual cases--cases in which circumstances have so changed
that the legislature's original formulation needs reexamination.
In those exceptional cases, everg reason exists to believe that
the legislature would approve of the modification the court has
adopted--or so the argument runs.
This approach paints a pretty picture. When applied to the
statute of limitations specifically, it suggests that the movement towards expansive discovery rules can be explained solely
in terms of changing times (in other words, the adoption of
such rules is the result of the need to accommodate the
growing number of modern tort victims who are innocently
ignorant of the circumstances surrounding their causes of
a~tion)."~
The argument would run thusly: Courts that have
Wash. St: Sen. J., 47th Leg., 616 (1981).
Remarkably, the Washington Supreme Court nevertheless held in North Coast
that the limitations period does not commence until after the plaintiff has actual
or constructive knowledge of the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.
119.
Courts adopting expansive discovery rules justify their decisions by arguing
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adopted expansive discovery rules have done so with the
implicit consent of legislatures. These legislatures would prefer
that courts m o m original formulations rather than passively
administer outdated statutes t o respond to changing circumstances.
This suggestion paints too pretty a picture. The notion that
legislatures can and should depend upon courts to fine tune
law formulation along the rule-standard continuum as circumstances change is a bit too optimistic. One of the problems, as I
have discussed above,'" is that the incentive structure for
judges tends to lead them to value appropriate adjudicative
results more heavily than they should relative t o the conduct
guidance function of the law. Legislatures may thus be better
advised t o look askance at judicial modification of statutes.
In cases like Bussineau and North Coast, courts have
adopted discovery rules that make it extremely Wicult for
defendants ever to feel secure. Even in those cases in which
plaintiff is aware of an injury and the fact the defendant
caused it, the limitations period will not begin t o run until the
plaints knows or should have known of fads suggesting the
defendant's wrongfulness. Consequently, one can expect defendants t o refrain from using their resources most productively. A
potential defendant is likely t o refrain from using resources to
start up a new enterprise only to have it foreclosed upon if a
lawsuit is brought. Instead, such a potential defendant will
prefer to engage in current consumption. As a guide for conduct, such a law is lacking.
Legislatures would not likely embrace such a profound
shift in the focus of the statute of limitations. As originally
drafted, the statute of limitations was neither plaintiff-focused
nor defendant-focused in the sense that it did not openly
embrace either the principle that every plaintiff should have a
reasonable opportunity to bring a claim or the counter-principle

that times have changed. Under this rationale, for example, the typical tort case a t
law can no longer be governed by as rigid a time limitation. Indeed, the argument
continues, there is no longer any such thing as the typical tort case. Changing
technologies have made cases involving unknown or unknowable injuries and causes of action more numerous than the legislatures that enacted the original statutes
of limitation could have dreamed. Examples would be the mass tort litigation surrounding asbestos use or the use of the miscarriage preventative diethylstilbestrol.
See, e.g., Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466 (NJ.1986); Hymowitz v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
120. See supra part II.D.4.

962

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNINERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992

that no defendant should have to defend a claim if, on account
of delay, the defendant has lost evidence. Indeed, in a legislature filled with different views about limitations policy, this
may have been the statute of limitation's chief appeal. The
rulelike statute of limitations essentially worked as a black box
compromise. It forced the competing principles embodied in
limitations policy into a somewhat arbitrary but workable balance. Most, though not all, of the adjudicative results would be
consistent with both principles. When a n expansive discovery
rule was added, however, the balance struck by the legislature
between the plaintiff-focused principle and the defendantfocused principle was jarred massively out of kilter. It hardly
seems likely that this would appeal to legislatures.
Perhaps most telling is the f a d that when faced with the
opportunity to adopt expansive discovery rules, legislatures
have not acted. Some have declined to adopt any kind of discovery rule.lzl Others have combined a short statute of
limitations, softened by a discovery rule, with a longer but
more rigid statute of repose? The latter solution is a particularly interesting one in that it accommodates to some extent the changing times argument without wholly sacrificing
protection for the potential defendant. Legislatures have thus
demonstrated no enthusiasm for the courts' heavily plaintifffocused, standardlike solution.
All of this is troubling. If courts systematically overvalue
adjudication relative to conduct guidance, then courts cannot be
trusted with the task of formulating laws along the rule-standard continuum. Because they are too close to individual controversies (and too removed from the effects of the laws they
promulgate on future conduct), they are inclined to overemphasize the need for appropriate adjudications a t the expense of
appropriate guidance for conduct. Because judges' reputations
depend on adjudication and not on formulating predictable
guidance for conduct, they have every reason to favor the goal
of appropriate adjudication to the detriment of appropriate conduct guidance.

121. See, e.g., U.C.C. 8 2-724 (1977).
122. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.ANN. 5 95.11 (West 1992). The Florida statute of limitations for medical malpractice set a two-year limitations period that commences at
the time of the incident giving rise to the action or at the time the incident is
discovered or should have been discovered. In no event, however, can an action be
brought more than four years after the incident.
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IV. SPECIAL
PROBLEMS FOR LEGISLATURES
TO CONTROL
COURTS
ATTEMPTING
This article assumes that legislators would prefer to retain
control over the formulation of the law, and that moreover, if
my suspicion that judges tend to undervalue the conduct
guidance function of the law is correct, that legislative
preference is a good thing. It therefore asks, "How do legislators retain control?" Sadly, the answer appears to be that in
the absence of a tradition of judicial deference to legislative
prerogative in formulation choice, there is very little that legislators can do except hope that courts will agree with their
choice of formulation. If judges systematically undervalue the
conduct-guidance function of the law and therefore consistently
discount rulelike formulations, the options available to legislators t o correct the problem are limited.
No lawmaker (legislature or otherwise) can successfully
control the fate of its laws unless it takes into consideration
and attempts to control the tendency of the law administrator
t o make adjustments.lzs This is true for all kinds of lawmaker-administrator pairs-parents and children, employers
and employees, school principals and teachers, appellate courts
and trial courts, and legislatures and courts. Administrators
are not automatons; they are human beings. Forcing them t o
conform to the lawmaker's plan is no easy task. It cannot be
avoided, however, unless the lawmaker is willing to cede to the
administrator the power and responsibility t o determine where
along the rule-standard continuum the law will be formulated.
The f i s t step the lawmaker must take to retain control of
the laws that it enacts is t o gain a thorough understanding of
the decision making processes of the law administrator. The
lawmaker must, as it were, know the administrator.
Decision-making styles have been catalogued at length. lZ4
In theory at least, these styles can run the gamut from the
pure particularist-who refuses to consider rules promulgated
123. If a lawmaker is convinced that a very rulelike formulation is the best
possible one for a particular law, it will do the lawmaker no good at all to promulgate such a rule if the lawmaker knows the administrator will not accept and
treat himself or herself as bound by the law's formal terms. The lawmaker must
somehow adjust the law so that the lawmaker's goals are achieved despite any
contrary proclivities the administrator may have. Unfortunately, this task may
prove difficult.
124. See Schauer, supra note 44.

964

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992

by lawmakers or the various benefits rules bring and instead
considers only the particular circumstances of the case-to the
pure rule-bound decision maker, who applies rules mechanically regardless of the consequences. In fact, however, both of
these decision making types may populate the legal literature
more often than they do the real world. Only an extraordinary
person could be a true rule-based decision maker, willing to go
with the rule regardless of the consequences. It is hard to
imagine a judge, for example, who would apply literally a
three-year statute of limitations to an ordinary tort case even
when to do so would result in the certain destruction of the
universe. When the stakes are high enough, even a rule-based
decision maker will override a rule, assuming that person is a t
all rational. lZ5
The same is true for particularists. The true particularist
does not recognize or approve of rules, and therefore would not
allow any of the particulars of the immediate fact situation to
be shrouded from con~ideration.'~~
Finding such a creature i n
nature would be a challenge. No rational reason exists for a
decision maker to adopt a system that includes everything except the value of rules. I t makes no more sense than if a decision maker were to consider everything except those things
that begin with the letter "p."127
The real world is populated by rule-sensitive particularists.
I n making a decision, a rule-sensitive particularist takes everything into consideration, including the existence and benefits of
any rule.lZ8 R-ulesensitive concerns include the following: (1)
the superior ability of the lawmaker to determine the best
course of action, even though the decision is made a t the
125. Larry Alexander, Law and Exclusionary Reasons, 18 PHIL. TOPICS5 (1990).
126. Calling particularistic decision making the "all things considered" approach
is not precisely correct, however. All things are not considered using the
particularistic approach to decision making. The value of rules is not considered. A
particularistic decision maker, as I use the term, does not consider the value of
having a rigid or semirigid rule that can be applied to future cases. Each case is
decided in an historical and institutional vacuum. No thought is given to the need
for a rule that will control the discretion of adjudicators in the future and provide
predictable results that can guide either primary activity or decision making in the
future. For the particularistic decision maker, everything is focused on the here
and now: the particular before it. Particularistic decision making, as I use the
term, can thus be contrasted with rule-sensitive particularism which is closer to a
true "all things considered'' approach, because i t does indeed consider the value of
rules in its calculus.
127. See Alexander, supra note 125.
128. Schauer, supra note 44.
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wholesale level; (2) the superior right of the lawmaker to determine the course of action, even if incorrect decisions (in the
immediate sense) are made; (3) the need to preserve decision
making resources, even a t the expense of some incorrect
decisions; (4) the need to have an agreed upon rule, even if i t is
second best, so that people can rely upon it; (5) the need to
have a n agreed upon rule, even if it is second best, so that
people that will perceive the adjudication process as fair; (6)
the need to follow the authority of the lawmaker in order to
influence others with a n inferior ability to discern the best
course of action; (7) the need to follow the authority of the
lawmaker in order to discourage the lawmaker from promulgating a worse rule; (8) the need to follow the authority of the
lawmaker in order to discourage others from replacing the
lawmaker with an authority that is even less beneficial; and (9)
any penalty the lawmaker may impose for failure to follow the
rule. Many of these factors should apply with full force even
when following the rule produces the second best result in a
particular case.
All of these considerations and probably others are
weighed in making a decision about whether to follow an available rule.129 The real differences among decision makers is
not whether they are purely particularistic or purely rulebound, but how heavily they weigh various rule values in their
calculus. Some will clearly weigh these considerations more
highly than others.
The closest one could expect to come to a true rule-based
decision maker among rational persons is likely to be a rulesensitive particularist who, based on his empirical observations
and his norms regarding rule values, esteems rules quite
highly. Conversely, the closest one can expect to come to a true
particularist in the real world is a rule-sensitive particularist
who happens to value rules very lightly.
A lawmaker must approach the administrator from this
standpoint and determine how highly the administrator values
rules. Once the lawmaker has sized up the administrator's
129. It is doubtful that every decision maker consciously and systematically
considers each of these matters prior to deciding whether to follow a particular
rule. Moreover, it is doubtful whether a systematic weighing of rule values occurs
very often. This is because rule-sensitive particularism is telescoping. When a true
rule-sensitive particularist takes into account the value of a rule that constrains
discretion, other self-imposed rules about the use of rules may be employed to
simplify the decision making process.
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decision-making style, the lawmaker can use that information
to retain control of the ultimate formulation of the enacted law.
If the administrator puts a higher value upon rules than the
lawmaker would have preferred, the lawmaker must fine tune
the statutory formulation of the law to make it more standardlike. Thus, it will be absolutely clear to the administrator
that some exercise of discretion is appropriate.
That is the simple case to solve. If the administrator puts a
lesser value upon rules than what the lawmaker would prefer
the solution is more difficult. The lawmaker must alter the
administrator's calculus by imposing a penalty upon the
administrator for failing to follow the rule. Such a penalty functions as a thumb upon the scale, inducing the law administrators to increase their regard for rules just enough to put them
in harmony with the lawmaker's plans. The lawmaker can thus
stay i n control, and the application of the law reflects the lawmaker's original choice.
There is, however, a problem. This approach works well if
the lawmaker is not a legislature and the law administrator is
not a judge. A parent can affect a child's rule calculus when the
child starts interpreting a very rulelike directive such as,
"Always be home by ten o'clock," more loosely than the parent
intended by grounding the child. An employer can respond to
an employee whose own view of the importance of rules
conflicts with the employer's by penalizing the employee for
failure to follow the rules with a proper degree of formalism.
Salaries can be set, in part, according to the employee's track
record. Administrative hoops can be set up for the employee to
jump through to prevent disobedience. Many options1" are
available to these 1aw1nakers.l~~
130. See Schauer, supra note 44.
131. If the particularistic decision maker could exist, however, and could promulgate his own laws, he would look a t the continuum of possible formulations of the
time-bar norm and choose the most flexible formulation possible. Such a formulation might go something like this: An action should be time barred if, considering
all the circumstances, it appears appropriate to do so in view of the length of time
that has elapsed between the time the cause of action arose and the time the
action was filed.
Such a formulation would be defective to the true particularistic decision maker
because i t suggests that the only remedy is to bar the action. The decision maker
will not have the right to impose other remedies for unreasonably tardy filing,
such a s reducing plaintiffs recovery by 50%. A better formulation from the
particularistic decision maker's point of view would be: An adjudicator should do
the appropriate thing in view of the length of time that has elapsed between the
time the cause of action arose and the time the action was filed. Unfortunately
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The options are not quite as rosy for legislatures attempting to control courts. Separation of powers prevents legislatures
from manipulating judges in quite the same way parents
manipulate their children or employers manipulate their
employees. Congress cannot fire an Article I11 judge for an
incorrect decision; Article I11 judges have life tenure during
good behavior. Congress cannot diminish the salary of a judge
during that judge's continuance in office.
Few tools of judicial control are available t o legislatures.
That is the way separation of powers is supposed to work and
correctly so. There is, however, a price t o be paid for separation
of powers. If I am correct in asserting that judges systematically undervalue the role of law as a guide for conduct, courts
that do not have a very strong ethic in favor of formalistic
interpretations of statutes will be inclined to reformulate many
statutes along the rule-standard continuum in a way that systematically undervalues rules, and legislatures can do little to
control this tendency. Their only option is to continually enact
more and more specific statutes.

There are perfectly plausible reasons for applying a more
rulelike formulation of limitations law to actions at law and a
more standardlike rule to equity cases. Nevertheless, recent
history has witnessed a near convergence between statutes of
limitation and the doctrine of laches. In particular, through the
use of discovery rules, many courts have transformed the statute of limitations into a near twin of the doctrine of laches.
Courts have attempted t o justify their departure from a formal

this formulation will also be defective from the point of view of the true
particularistic decision maker. Such a decision maker will not appreciate the fact
that he is constrained to measure the motion of tardiness from the time the cause
of action arose to the time the cause of action was filed. Why must the decision
maker be so limited? What if the plaintiff filed quickly but waited an unreasonable
amount of time to serve the complaint or to conduct discovery? Moreover, why
should the decision maker be forced to view tardiness in isolation? What action our
decision maker thinks is appropriate as a result of plaintiffs diligence or lack
thereof may be contingent upon the action our decision maker has taken on the
substantive aspects of the case. Ultimately, therefore, our particularistic decision
maker will have to insist on this formulation: "Do the right thing under all the
circumstances (but do not consider the value of rules)." Once we have reached this
point on the rule-standard line, it is questionable whether we are dealing with law
at all. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that a decision that is "ungoverned by rule" is "ungoverned by law").
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reading and application of the statute of limitations (with some
logic) by pointing out that legislatures could not have anticipated the increase in the number of cases that involve unknown
and unknowable injuries. Such courts are, however, perhaps a
bit too optimistic in their belief that the enacting legislatures
would have approved of the convergence. I have outlined several reasons why a legislature might nevertheless prefer a very
rulelike statute of limitations. My purpose in so doing was to
suggest that courts that change rules into standards should be
viewed with suspicion, in part because they are increasing their
own power.
More important, courts may systematically tend to undervalue the importance of rulelike formulations for reasons of
self-interest, quite apart from the direct pursuit of power. Statutes of limitation, like all laws, have at least two functions.
They are adjudicative guides and they are conduct guides. The
optimal formulation for guiding adjudication is not the same as
the optimal formulation for guiding conduct. Indeed, most lawmakers would probably find that, in the case of statutes of limitation, the optimal formulation for the purpose of guiding conduct would be considerably more rulelike than the optimal formulation for the purpose of guiding adjudication. The need to
ensure that potential defendants will at some point be able t o
consider themselves immune from suit and go about their business is great. Only rules can give such an assurance.
Any lawmaker must strike a balance between adjudication
and conduct according to what it perceives to be the community's more pressing need. Unfortunately, judges are likely
systematically to favor the use of laws as guides for
adjudication over their use as guides for conduct. When judges
decide cases, they are responsible for the outcome. If a judge's
decision does not comport with the community's comprehensive
view of the case, his or her prestige directly suffers.
On the other hand, the effect of any particular decision on
conduct is indirect and tenuous. The public generally will be
reacting not just t o one decision but t o groups of decisions.
Judges will therefore be tempted to free-ride on other judges.
Each judge will attempt to depend upon other judges t o maintain the intensity of the rule as a conduct guide while she
cheats a bit for the sake of achieving better adjudicative
results. The problem is, of course, that all judges have an
incentive to follow this strategy. If all do, no one is left to
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maintain the integrity of the rule. -Guiding adjudication ends
up taking undue precedence over guiding conduct.
The result with respect to the statute of limitations has
been predictable. Discovery rules shift considerable discretion
to judges and juries to determine whether plaintiff knew or
should have known sufficient facts to bring a cause of action. In
doing so, they appear to yield fairer outcomes in the specific
case decided. At the same time, they are likely to yield a far
inferior result for the conduct guidance function of the law. As
a result, potential defendants do not and cannot know when it
is safe t o move their resources, which are otherwise put on hold
pending litigation, into productive use. If the judge strikes the
balance between using law as a guide for adjudication and
using it as a guide for conduct based purely on the judge's selfinterest, the community loses.
Unfortunately, there may be little legislatures can do to
regulate judges' behavior in this regard. Unlike other lawmaker-law administrator relationships, such as parent-child or
employer-employee relationships, the relationship between
legislature and judiciary is characterized by separation and
independence. Legislatures have no power, aside from persuasion, to impose penalties on judges for reformulating a given
statute along the rule-standard continuum.

